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Adviser: Professor Ping Ji
This research is dedicated to the study of the challenges faced by Cognitive Radio (CR)
networks, which include self-coexistence of the networks in the spectral environment, secu-
rity and performance threats from malicious entities, and fairness in spectrum contention
and utilization. We propose novel channel acquisition schemes that allow decentralized CR
networks to have multiple channel access with minimal spectrum contentions. The multiple
channel acquisition schemes facilitate fast spectrum access especially in cases where networks
cannot communicate with each other. These schemes enable CR networks to self-organize
and adapt to the dynamically changing spectral environment.
We also present a self-coexistence mechanism that allows CR networks to coexist via
the implementation of a risk-motivated channel selection based deference structure (DS). By
forming DS coalitions, CR networks are able to have better access to preferred channels and
can defer transmission to one another, thereby mitigating spectrum conflicts.
CR networks are also known to be susceptible to Sybil threats from smart malicious
radios with either monopolistic or disruptive intentions. We formulate novel threat and
defense mechanisms to combat Sybil threats and minimize their impact on the performance
of CR networks. A dynamic reputation system is proposed that considerably minimizes
the effectiveness of intelligent Sybil attacks and improves the accuracy of spectrum-based
decision-making processes.
vFinally, we present a distributed and cheat-proof spectrum contention protocol as an
enhancement of the adaptive On-Demand Spectrum Contention (ODSC) protocol. The
Modified On-Demand Spectrum Contention (MODSC) protocol enhances fairness and effi-
ciency of spectrum access. We also show that there is substantial improvement in spectrum
utilization with the incorporation of channel reuse into the MODSC protocol.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Wireless communication is one of the fastest growing sectors of the telecommunication in-
dustry. With successful deployment of cellular networks in licensed bands and wireless
networks, such as Wi-Fi, in unlicensed bands, users have anytime, anywhere connectivity
with networked systems, leading to the Internet of Things (IoT)[2]. The current static spec-
trum assignment by government regulatory agencies, such as the Federal Communication
Commission (FCC) in the United States, does not support ubiquitous provision of wireless
services. The fixed spectrum allocations are usually long-term and wasteful since only about
15%− 80% of the available spectrum resources are actually put to use [3] [4].
Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) offered through cognitive radios (CR) is one of the most
promising frameworks for alleviating the crunching pressure put forth on the FCC by many
of the wireless providers. In contrast to the legacy fixed spectrum allocation policies, DSA
allows license-exempt secondary users (SUs) to access the licensed spectrum bands when not
in use by the licensed owners, also known as primary users (PUs). DSA is expected to enable
more efficient use of frequency channels without impacting the primary licensees [5].
According to the DSA, SUs are practically invisible to the PUs. The SUs are required to
observe spectrum etiquette to avoid creating harmful interference to PUs activities. Spec-
1
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trum overlay is one of the DSA approaches that allow SUs to opportunistically sense and
detect idle spectrum bands and use them without interference. SUs are required to identify
and avoid in timely manner licensed bands that are in use by PUs [6] [7].
However, there are no specifications regarding the coexistence of SUs in the spectral
environment. Just like the licensed owners need not to be aware of secondary transmission
activities, isolated SUs are practically “blind” to one another. Therefore, they are likely to
cause harmful interference to each other’s communication. The interference experienced by
SUs is exacerbated by need to dynamically select multiple channels. This results in intense
competition among SUs for available spectrum resources. As a result, available spectrum
resources are often misused or abandoned in the process of finding free spectrum bands.
With all SUs scavenging for available spectrum resources, the system becomes vulnerable to
self-coexistence and security issues.
1.1 An Overview of Dynamic Spectrum Access
DSA was proposed as an alternative paradigm to alleviate the crunching pressure on Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) to deviate from the practice of fixed spectrum allocation
policies. The main goal of DSA, as originally presented at the first IEEE Symposium on New
Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks [8], is to replace the current static spectrum
allocation model with an open spectrum access model or at least allow the identification and
exploitation of under-utilized spectrum resources. In other words, license-exempt SUs can
access the licensed spectrum bands when they are not in use by the licensed owners (PUs).
The DSA approach is expected to alleviate the problem of spectrum scarcity and starvation
by providing standards and specifications for opportunistic exploration and exploitation of
underutilized spectrum bands. The exploitation of the under-utilized and idle spectrum
bands creates numerous opportunities for the provision of a variety of wireless services by
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service providers.
DSA spectrum management models are broadly categorized into three models: dynamic
exclusive use model, open sharing model and hierarchical model [9]. The dynamic exclusive
model maintains the current spectrum regulation policy but allows the licensed owners the
flexibility to sell and trade spectrum and to freely choose technology. Another approach of
this model suggests dynamic spectrum allocation that involves the exploitation of the spatial
and temporal traffic statistics of different spectrum activities to decide whether spectrum is
idle or busy. The dynamic exclusive use model does not exclude the presence of TV white
spaces1 resulting from the bursty nature of wireless traffic.
The open sharing model, also referred to as spectrum commons [11] [12], is one of the
spectrum management model that proposes the sharing of spectral region among peer users.
In contrast to the dynamic exclusive model, open sharing model calls for the elimination of
property rights for exclusive use of spectrum. Under this model, the right to access or use the
spectrum is shared among users subject to a protocol, etiquette, or framework that supports
spectrum management [12]. This model has been successful in wireless applications in the
unlicensed industrial, scientific and medical (ISM) radio band (e.g. WiFi). Both centralized
[13],[14] and distributed [15]-[16] spectrum sharing strategies have been investigated under
the open sharing spectrum management model.
The hierarchical access model proposes the opening of the licensed spectrum to SUs
while limiting the interference perceived by PUs. This model considers three approaches -
spectrum underlay, spectrum overlay, and interweave. Spectrum underlay approach imposes
transmission power constraint on the secondary users that requires them to operate below
the noise floor of the primary users. Spectrum overlay allows for concurrent primary and
secondary transmission, based on the premise that secondary communication can assist (re-
1White spaces are large portions of spectrum in the UHF/VHF bands which become available on a
geographical basis after digital switchover[10].
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Figure 1.1: A cross-section of a channel with multiple spectrum decision [1].
lay) primary transmissions [17]. Interweave approach entails opportunistic spectrum access,
first proposed by Mitola [18]. It targets the spatial and temporal white space by allowing
secondary users unrestricted access to identify and exploit local and instantaneous spectrum
opportunity. Research studies conducted by FCC [19] and the wireless industry show that
some part of the spectrum remain unutilized over time. The hierarchical access model seems
to be the most compatible with the current spectrum management policies and legacy wire-
less systems. The implementation of hierarchical model can significantly improve spectrum
efficiency.
1.2 Cognitive Radio Technology
Cognitive radios are intelligent radio devices that have the capability to periodically perform
spectrum sensing to discover unused frequencies in licensed bands and utilize it for trans-
mission purposes [20]. Cognitive radios were preceded by software-defined radios. Software-
defined radios are simply multiband radios that support multiple air interfaces and is re-
configurable via software run on a digital signal processor (DSP) or a general purpose micro-
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processors [21]. J. Mitola promoted both cognitive and software-defined radios in the 1990s.
The cognitive radios, in contrast, were designed to be aware of the spectrum environment
with in-built intelligence to automatically re-configure and adapt to their changing environ-
ment. The cognitive ability of radios provides a variety of ways of improving many aspects
of communication systems, and addressing important issues such as spectrum scarcity and
quality of service. Cognitive radio technology makes it possible to implement the basic
features of the opportunistic spectrum model (OSA), which include spectrum opportunity
identification, spectrum opportunity exploitation and regulatory policy.
An important regulatory aspect is that SUs must not interfere with the operations in the
licensed bands and must identify and avoid such bands in a timely manner [6] [7]. In a case,
where any of the bands used by an SU is accessed by the licensed incumbent2, that SU is
required to immediately vacate the spectrum band within the channel move time and switch
to another band [22].
With the enhanced capability to switch from one band to another, SUs face yet another
serious challenge in the form of spectrum contention. For instance, the 802.11 WLANs are
ubiquitous and operate in unlicensed frequency bands with deployments that could be un-
structured [23]. Within a band, an 802.11 WLAN network can select one of several available
channels without any instruction from the router. This implies that 802.11 WLANs inde-
pendently decide to remain on the same channel or switch to another channel with better
characteristics. Coordinated channel selection is hampered by the fact the interference range
of a typical 802.11 device is substantially larger than its communication range [23]. There-
fore, the wireless devices can interfere and are unable to implement any specific messaging
protocol or even report their positions.
2Licensed incumbent refer to a primary user that has the full authority to operate on an FCC-allocated
spectrum band.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 6
1.3 Motivation
Self-coexistence poses significant challenge to the performance of cognitive radio (CR) net-
works [24]. CR networks have to coexist in such a way that allows them optimally exploit
the scarce spectrum resources. To reduce spectrum scarcity, CR networks have to dynam-
ically exploit unused licensed bands. However, the activities of the secondary users in the
spectrum environment are often uncoordinated, which leads to the wastage of valuable spec-
trum opportunities. To ensure efficient usage of the available spectrum resources, an efficient
spectrum-sharing model that supports coexistence is needed.
We consider a decentralized system of CR networks, where there is no central authority
to coordinate spectrum activities. Also, the system lacks secondary-secondary etiquette or
protocol that facilitates coordination among the networks. Due to interference and inability
to determine their location [23], networks are unable to decode each others messages. As a
result, they cannot detect the spectrum activities in their vicinity. A typical example is an
emergency situation that requires quick setup of a cognitive radio network in the presence
of inter-network communication constraints. In such a case, an end-to-end communication,
made possible by the implementation centralized spectrum allocation solutions, might be
inapplicable. Our goal is to design heuristics and algorithms that enable CR networks to
identify and use spectrum resources in such a way that minimizes contention, improves
efficiency of spectrum utilization and reduces the time wasted searching for contention-free
channels.
Many protocols and standards have been designed to enable spectrum sharing in cen-
tralized networks [25] [26]. Often these protocol designs and standards do not incorporate
features that guarantee fairness and security. On-demand Spectrum Contention (ODSC) is
the state-of-the-art protocol designed to support spectrum sharing in 802.22 wireless regional
area networks (WRAN). The protocol allows networks to contend for available spectrum
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bands by comparing randomly generated contention priority numbers (CPN). According to
the protocol, the winner of the spectrum contention is the network that generated the largest
or smallest CPN depending on the criteria adopted by the contending networks. Although
ODSC is design to address the self-coexistence problem, the protocol design and standards
do not incorporate features that guarantee fairness and security of the spectrum contention
process. For instance, the arbiter of the spectrum contention is the network that is cur-
rently occupying the contended channel, also referred to as the contention destination. The
protocol assumes that the spectrum contention arbiters are unbiased and adhere strictly to
the protocol specifications. Even though ODSC supports distributed and real-time spectrum
sharing, the design flaws expose the spectrum contention process to cheating and gives unfair
advantage to the contention destinations. Our main objective is to design a self-coexistence
protocol that guarantees fairness and security of the spectrum contention process.
The “open access” philosophy of the FCC-proposed DSA paradigm makes cognitive ra-
dio networks susceptible to various unforeseen attacks by smart malicious radios. The effect
of malicious disruptions can be even more fatal as there is no way to understand whether
the disruptions are intentional or not. The motivation for such shadow- disruptive attack
behavior can be either monopolistic — to capture as much spectrum as possible for them-
selves without maintaining any spectrum sharing etiquettes and make other secondary users
starve [27]; or adversarial — to disrupt other secondary users communications and shut them
down (particularly applicable in environments filled with adversary users/networks) [28]. The
current DSA paradigm lacks the protocols to handle most of the security issues arising in
a cognitive network [29], [30]. The Sybil attack, which is classified as an identity spoofing
attack, is one of the most common security issues in cognitive radio network. During a
Sybil attack, a malicious attacker operates with multiple identities, pretending to be multi-
ple distinct entities [31]. Sybil attacks are possible because of the ability of a cognitive radio
device to reconfigure operating parameters, including its identity. The malicious attacker can
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then make several false sensing reports with different identities. The false sensing reports,
if considered, can alter the results of major spectrum decision making processes [32]. The
Sybil threats using malicious cognitive radio(s) in DSA networks are even more prevalent
and dangerous for several reasons:
1. They are highly ”mobile” in every possible aspect due to the characteristics of software
re-configurability;
2. DSA networks are susceptible to attacks ranging from passive eavesdropping to ac-
tive interfering, frequent break-ins by adversaries due to their open, ubiquitous and
interoperable nature [33];
3. Due to the open source nature of DSA networks, it is practically impossible to establish
a standard database to record the identity of every CR [34].
This work also considers the problem of intelligent and context-aware Sybil attacks in
cognitive radio networks. The most important aspect being the capability of an attacker to
learn its environment and use the knowledge obtained to carry out intelligent and sophisti-
cated attacks.
1.4 Related Works
This dissertation is a compendium of published works [35] [36] [37] [38] and a book chap-
ter [39]. The discussion of the related works is logically organized into the following sub-
sections: 1) Self-coexistence and spectrum allocation challenges faced by CR networks; 2)
Coalition formation in wireless networks, 3) Spectrum Contention protocol, and 4) Sybil
attacks in CR networks.
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1.4.1 Self-coexistence in CR networks
Most overlapping cognitive radio networks face the challenge of self-coexistence. In the
absence of a central authority that coordinates spectrum activities, the networks are exposed
to conflicts that degrade performance and reduce spectrum utilization.
Sengupta et al. [24] addressed the problem of self-coexistence between cognitive radio
networks from a game theoretical point of view. The model used in their study is a modified
version of Minority game model (MMG), and assumed that networks select a channel without
the knowledge of the channels selected by other networks. They suggested a Nash equilibrium
switching probability that guarantees convergence of the system when decisions made by
networks to find contention-free channels are modeled as a mixed strategy game. This
approach suffers from its limitation to single channel acquisition problem and does not
address convergence time.
Self-coexistence problem is often addressed as a spectrum allocation problem. Recent
works by Cao et al. [40] and Anand et al. [41] addressed self-coexistence problem from a
graph theoretical perspective as a graph coloring problem. They assumed a centralized
network setting where networks require single channel to operate. Sengupta et al. [42]
introduced Utility Graph Coloring (UGC) with primary focus on the improvement of spectral
efficiency and spectrum utilization in cognitive radio-based networks such wireless regional
area networks (WRANs). UGC, by design, is constrained to work only in centralized system
that implements broadcast messaging, aggressive contention resolution scheme and other
techniques.
Recently, efforts have been made to address self-coexistence problem in a decentralized
network setting. Barcelo et al. [43] suggested the learning-BEB algorithm for collision-free
scheduling in 802.11 networks. The algorithm is a modified version of the CSMA/CA mech-
anism with truncated exponential back-off. The algorithm is simple to implement but suffers
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from slow convergence rates [44]. Duffy et al. proposed the Communication Free Learning
(CFL) algorithm. The CFL algorithm implements a stochastic learning mechanism to up-
date the probability of selecting a channel based on local information. The CFL algorithm is
quite adaptive to changes in topology and quite fast in convergence. All the afore-mentioned
decentralized algorithms assume single channel requirement by the networks. A modified
version of the CFL algorithm, known as the simplified CFL (SCFL) [45], gives similar con-
vergence rate performance like the CFL algorithm but with less memory and processing
power.
As Duffy et al. (Duffy, 2013) correctly identified in their work on decentralized constraint
satisfaction, it is possible to have limited communication between entities in system, espe-
cially in wireless network settings. Most of the algorithms for channel selection assume the
existence of an end-to-end communication for centralized solutions, for control messaging so-
lutions or some sort of global coordination in simulated annealing proposals [46] [47] [48] [49].
Algorithms proposed for distributed systems can be found in works by Mishra [50],
Zhao [51] and Nie [52]. These algorithms exploit control messaging to support commu-
nication based on learned spectral trends. However, the algorithms introduce a great deal of
overhead messaging cost. A number of protocol designs for self-coexistence in both central-
ized and distributed networks can be found in [53] [54] [22] [9]. The performance of these
protocols in a decentralized setting degrades with persistent interference caused by the lack
of unified messaging interface. As a result, there are often no incentives for networks to
implement one type of protocol in preference to another in order to sustain the coexistence
of the CR networks.
1.4.2 Coalition Formation in Wireless Networks
Saad et al. [55] and Hao et al. [56] made notable contributions to the concept of coalition for-
mation in wireless networks. Both works address coalition formation from a game-theoretical
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point of view. The main problem lies in finding the optimal partitioning that maximizes util-
ities of the emergent coalition.
Saad et al. suggested a distributed merge-and-split algorithm that allows networks to
form coalitions in order to maximize utilities. The model measured utility in terms of power
needed to broadcast and the number of users in a given coalition. In terms of broadcast
power, the farther apart the networks, the more the cost incurred to cooperate. Likewise, cost
also increases with the increasing cumulative cost of maintaining connectivity with members
of the coalition. The proposed algorithm assumes that the resulting self-organization of the
entities in the system is guided by their interest to improve individual user’s payoff. The
stability of the network coalitions formed is supported by the concept of defection function.
That is, using the merge-and-split algorithm, the networks are partitioned such that there
is no incentive for a network to switch to another coalition.
Hao [56] studied coalition formation among networks to enhance collaborative spectrum
sensing. The formation of coalition is lead by the need by the networks to sense accurately
and enhance energy efficiency. Therefore, the utility function dependent on sensing accuracy
and energy efficiency of the coalitions. Each coalition is tasked to sense a particular channel;
therefore the number of coalition is equivalent to the number of channels available. A dis-
tributed algorithm was proposed to find the optimal partition that maximizes the aggregate
utility of all coalitions in the system.
1.4.3 Spectrum Contention Protocols
Several primary user protection mechanisms have been suggested in [57], which addresses
primary-secondary spectrum etiquette. However, the issue of secondary-secondary spectrum
etiquette that deals with the ability of secondary users to coexist in same spectrum envi-
ronment receives little attention. The introduction of the on-demand spectrum contention
(ODSC) protocol was part of the several effort to address the issue of spectrum scarcity as
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it relates to self-coexistence [58] [59].
Hu et al. [58] first proposed an adaptive ODSC protocol, a self-coexistence oriented pro-
tocol designed specifically for 802.22 WRAN networks. The ODSC protocol leverages the
MAC messaging on the inter-network communication channel to provide inter-network spec-
trum sharing opportunity among coexisting WRAN networks. The protocol allows WRAN
networks to compete for shared spectrum by simply exchanging and comparing randomly
generated contention priority numbers (CPNs).
Lin et al. [60] addressed the cascading spectrum contention problem associated with
ODSC. The problem was studied using the percolation-based model in the context of the
cognitive radio networks. Lin suggested a biased model that prevents a starved network
from triggering successive spectrum contentions and limits the spatial cascading impact of
the spectrum contentions. Other flaws have been identified with the ODSC protocol but
have since received little or no attention. The protocol assumes that all participants in the
spectrum contention process are honest and CPN cannot be manipulated. These assumptions
makes it possible for a very few of the networks to “hijack” the spectrum contentions, thereby
leaving others to starve.
1.4.4 Sybil Attacks in Cognitive Radio Networks
Several approaches have been proposed to prevent or mitigate Sybil attacks. These ap-
proaches range from the use of cryptographic methods to the simply approach of mon-
itoring the MAC layer for malicious activities. A lot of studies of wireless security use
traditional cryptographic tools that are normally based on computational assumptions and
maybe equally invalid in the future [61]. The use of reputation systems in counteracting
Sybil attacks has been suggested in many works on Sybil attacks [62]. Cheng and Fried-
man [63] evaluated the vulnerability of reputation systems to Sybil attacks. Reputation
systems were broadly classified into symmetric and asymmetric reputation systems. Cheng
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and Friedman [63] also proved that symmetric reputation systems, such as EigenTrust [64],
PageRank [65] and [66], are more vulnerable to Sybil attacks. In contrast, asymmetric
reputation systems are more resilient to such attacks. Asymmetric reputation system relies
on some trusted nodes from which all reputation values are propagated. Such systems raises
the cost of fomenting a Sybil attack because the attacker is forced into building enough
reputation before any successful attack can take place [62].
Tan et.al. [67] discussed the feasibility of Sybil attacks in CR networks. Beside being
capable of launching primary user emulation (PUE) attacks, a Sybil attacker can use multiple
identities to compromise spectrum decision making process. A detail analysis on how a
reputation system can be used to mitigate against Sybil attacks in CR networks can be
found in [67], [36]. In [68] and [69], a received signal indicator (RSSI) based solution was
proposed. The solution requires the collaboration of trusted nodes to enhance the accuracy
of the approach. The approach suffers serious drawbacks due to overhead cost arising from
extra computational and memory costs.
The authors of [70] suggests the MAC level monitoring to differentiate between a single
attacker spoofing multiple addresses and a group of nodes that are at close proximity. While
some approaches proposed in these works assume static nature of Sybil attacks, some of them
are not adaptable to the CR network scenario. An effective solution to the problem of Sybil
attacks in CR networks must not only be applicable in CR networks but also lightweight,
scalable and robust to intelligence-based Sybil attacks.
There are also many works devoted to the design of reputation management systems that
enforce cooperation of entities in a network setting [71], [72], [73], [74]. According to [71],
the main functions of a reputation management system must include behavior evaluation,
behavior detection and reaction to the detected behavior. The evaluation function involves
the use of a metric to score node based on their behavior. The detection function focuses
on distinguishing between honest nodes and malicious nodes based on their reputation. The
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reaction function takes action against or in favor of nodes based on their reputation. For
a reputation management system to be effective, the evaluation criteria, detection decision
factors and reactive measures should be adaptive to changes in the network in time and
space [71].
Fuzzy logic controllers (FLC) have found widespread acceptance in systems that require
robust control of parameters especially in responding to sudden critical changes. Fuzzy logic
techniques have been successfully applied in wireless networks to improve security [75], to
manage vehicle movement at intersections [76], to implement traffic adaptation in Wireless
Mesh Networks (WMNs) [77], to implement intelligent network selection in 4G networks [78],
to control transmission rate in wireless multimedia sensor networks [79]. FLC is known to
be a non-linear intelligent and adaptive control based on artificial Intelligence [80]. FLCs
rely on fuzzy membership functions and rules for smooth control of a system’s parameters.
We implemented an FLC with the intention of intelligently and dynamically controlling the
reputation function parameters of nodes. The reputation function parameters leverages the
FLC to control λ values of reporting nodes based on their observed spectrum reporting
behavior.
1.5 Contributions
In this section, we discuss the main contributions of this research work. Not many researches
have been done to address some of the self-coexistence issues discussed in this work, as they
pertain to spectrum sharing and spectrum contention. We also highlight the efforts made to
enhance efficiency of spectrum utilization and address security issues surrounding spectrum
decision and the implementation of spectrum contention protocol.
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1.5.1 Multi-Channel Selection in a Decentralized Network Setting
In a decentralized setting, control-messaging techniques cannot fully address the challenges
faced by networks during channel selection. Communication constraints make it difficult
for networks to know the channels selected by their neighbors and avoid transmitting over
them. With increasing demand for spectrum resources, it becomes inefficient and expensive
to maintain control channels that could have been used for actual data transmission. In
fact, reserving some channels for control messaging, in a system where networks are already
starved of spectrum resources, will only exacerbate the spectrum scarcity. Therefore, instead
of relying on control messaging to coordinate spectrum activities, a decentralized approach
that allows networks to select channels with minimal interference can be implemented.
We propose channel acquisition heuristics that facilitate selection of multiple channels by
networks. The implementation of the channel acquisition heuristics is suited for a decentral-
ized system, where communication between networks is constrained by interference and lack
of unified communication protocol. The channel acquisition heuristics provide alternative
means for networks to select channels for transmission with minimal or zero coordination.
The heuristics implements mechanisms that minimize spectrum contention and facilitates
fast convergence - networks settling on preferred channels in short period of time.
As part of the multiple channel acquisition heuristics, we suggest a channel-ranking al-
gorithm that facilitates decision making by networks during spectrum contention. Basically,
networks have to make decision to “stay” or “switch” on multiple channels. By aggregating
channel profile history, networks can use the proposed algorithm to determine and select less
contentious channels for transmission purposes. The channel-ranking algorithm is a modified
version of the merge sort algorithm, where the rates of successful and failed transmissions
are used as the comparison criteria. To capture the actual performance of channels during
the early stages of multiple channel acquisition, the normalized success rate is used up until
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enough channel profile information have been gathered.
We analyze spectrum contention problem in decentralized system of cognitive radio net-
works as a birthday paradox problem. The analysis shows that the possibility of at least
two networks contending the same channel follows an exponential distribution. We ap-
proximated the probability Pr{Dn} of n ≥ 2 networks contending the same channel as
Pr{Dn} ≥ 1 − e−n(n−1)/2m, where n is the number of networks and m is the number of
available channels. The analysis also shows that an increase in spectrum scarcity, with fixed
number of contending networks, increases the frequency of spectrum contentions, and vice
versa. A general definition of expected number of contending pairs on a given channel in
terms of n and m is presented. By showing that FX(n) = Pr{Dn} where FX(n) is the cumu-
lative distribution function (CDF), a non-decreasing function, the probability distribution
function (PDF) fX(n) of networks contending on a particular channel is derived.
Finally, a detail comparison of the channel acquisition heuristics based on simulation
results is given. The results show that the find-and-keep (FAK) algorithm out-performs the
state-of-the-art communication-free learning (CFL) algorithm in multiple channel selection
irrespective of the scale of the network. Utility, convergence and frequency of spectrum
contention are used as metrics to evaluate the performance of the algorithms.
1.5.2 Self-coexistence using Risk-Motivated Deference Structure
In our work, we are interested in the dynamic spectrum access with focus on secondary-
secondary spectrum etiquette and self-coexistence mechanism that can foster better perfor-
mance of cognitive radio networks and reduce the amount of contention they experience. In
the face of spectrum scarcity, cognitive radio networks incur huge amount of losses while
competing for available spectrum resources.
As a way to minimize these losses we present a self-coexistence mechanism that allows
cognitive radio networks to coexist with each other. This mechanism involves a channel se-
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lection heuristics that takes into consideration the amount of spectrum contention risk faced
by a CR network. The system model is such that CR networks form deference structure
(DS) community to have more efficient access to a channel of interest. Networks can defer
transmission to another on deference channel, thereby minimizing their chances of conflict-
ing on the same channel. The DS model relies on the ability of CR networks to adhere
to DS agreement which supports the idea of networks sharing and deferring transmission
opportunities to other member networks in urgent need. DS model supports reciprocity to
promote fairness with the primary goal of mitigating spectrum contention between networks
belonging to the DS coalition.
As part of the decision making process to join a DS community, CR networks rely on a
risk-motivated channel selection scheme to evaluate the tentative deference structure channel.
We provide numerical and simulation results that demonstrates the benefits of the proposed
self-coexistence mechanism. We also show how the mechanism can help networks to coor-
dinate their spectrum activities, minimize the number of contentions and improve spectrum
utility. We also highlighted the impact of DS community size on expected performance of
member networks.
1.5.3 Sustenance against Intelligent Sybil Attacks using Dynamic
Reputation System
This work presents an overview of intelligent and context-aware Sybil attack in a CR net-
works. We model Sybil attacks as intelligence-based attacks that apply the reinforcement
learning technique, Q- learning, in selecting false identities for spectrum reporting. The most
important aspect of the model is capability of an attacker to learn its environment and use
the knowledge obtained to carry out intelligent and sophisticated attacks.
We propose a novel reputation system that tracks the reputations of CR nodes reporting
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spectrum state. We present the dynamic reputation system with security framework to
mitigate the impact of malicious Sybil nodes on spectrum decisions made by the fusion
center (FC). The dynamic reputation system controlled by FC relies on non-linear reputation
functions to compute reputations of CR nodes. The reputation system is shown to be flexible
but robust to the accuracy of spectrum reports.
We suggest the use of a fuzzy logic controller (FLC) to control reputation function pa-
rameter λ was suggested. The FLC plays very important role in reputation evaluation as it
implements built-in logic required to control the quantum of change ∆λ. This provides the
reactionary mechanism that is needed to respond to changes in reporting behavior of CR
nodes by dynamically adjusting the reputation growth rate λ.
1.5.4 Modified On-Demand Spectrum Contention Protocol
Here, we address some of the vulnerabilities of ODSC protocol. We propose a modified
version of the ODSC that addresses security loopholes associated with the protocol. Modified
ODSC does not rely on min-max criteria to decide winner of spectrum contention. Rather it
exploits the zero-knowledge principle to prevent the exposure of contention priority numbers
(CPNs) prior to the decision-making stage in the spectrum contention process. Winners of
spectrum contention are computed in a distributed manner, denying the current occupant
of a contended channel the autonomy to decide the outcome of the spectrum contention
process.
We show that the decision function used in MODSC is non-cheatable and collusion proof.
This guarantees fairness, eliminating the possibility of a group of colluding contenders to
“hijack” spectrum resources. The decision function is computationally simple and collision-
free. This is because the distributed computation of the function produces the same result.
As a result, exactly one winner emerges at the end of the contention and all participants are
instantly aware of the outcome.
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We show that the protocol’s support for repeated spectrum contention can lead to chan-
nel reuse. This increases the number of networks that can exploit the available spectrum
resources, thereby reducing starvation and increasing spectrum utility. However, channel
reuse is constrained by the network topology and depends on the average degree of the
conflict graph formed by the networks.
Chapter 2
Multiple Channel Acquisition in
Decentralized System of Cognitive
Radio Networks
2.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses coexistence of cognitive radio (CR) networks with multiple channel
requirements in an uncoordinated decentralized system. The study falls into a neglected
aspect of cognitive radio technology, involving secondary-to-secondary etiquette, commonly
referred to as self-coexistence. Our goal is to develop strategies and algorithms to enhance
self-coexistence in an uncoordinated spectrum environment where communication between
secondary networks is incapacitated by factors such as interference constraints and the ab-
sence of common communication protocol.
We address such situations where CR networks are in need of multiple channels to op-
erate in order to meet quality of service requirements. A typical example is the case where
interference networks exceed transmission ranges between networks. The outcome is such
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that networks cannot coordinate their activities in the spectrum environment, and therefore
risks interfering with each other’s operation. This constitutes a self-coexistence problem
since it involves the search of an optimal spectrum assignment with no conflicts between
the operating cognitive radio networks. Previous efforts have been made using graph color-
ing techniques to ensure that an optimal spectrum assignment is achieved in a cooperative
network setting. However, in a decentralized network setting with no communication be-
tween networks, coordination via message exchange becomes a major challenge. Since there
is no coordinated access to spectrum resources, spectrum contention intensifies, leading to
interference and poor spectrum utilization.
We propose multi-channel acquisition heuristics that allows networks to contend and
acquire spectrum bands to satisfy their needs. The main challenge in designing such heuris-
tics is the need to have coordinate pattern of searching for free bands without coordination
between networks. This implies that spectrum decisions are made by the networks are in-
dependently by each network and thus do not constitute common knowledge. The decision
to select a subset of spectrum bands in preference to other available spectrum bands is also
carried out independently of surrounding neighbor networks. Thus, the possibility that the
interests of two given networks will conflict is quite significant.
A channel acquisition heuristic can be seen as a strategy that can be used by cognitive
radio networks operating in wireless medium to acquire idle channels with minimal spectrum
contention. Networks contend basically because they anticipate other contenders to select or
switch to a different channel. As we know, continued contention between networks would lead
to reduced spectrum utilization and poor system performance. Since there is no unilateral or
prior agreement between the networks, spectrum contention remains the only way to secure
one or more channel for transmission purposes in a communication-constrained system as
described above.
A typical example of a contention avoidance mechanism can be found in [81]. To re-
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Figure 2.1: An illustration of channel acquisition1 process in cognitive radio networks. CR
networks switch from one channel to another in search of a contention-free channel.
solve contention among cognitive radios, a carrier sense multiple access (CSMA) scheme is
used to allocate channel time among competing cognitive radios based on a reserve system.
According to the scheme, radios use a back-off mechanism to determine which time slot to
transmit. The back-off time is chosen according to a uniform distribution on a given interval
of time. Such back-off mechanism is not compatible with a decentralized system of cognitive
networks with multiple channel demand. The networks would have to maintain separate
back-off mechanisms for different channels. More so, the system architecture under consid-
eration does not support fragmentation of spectrum opportunity into time slots, which is
common with most CSMA schemes.
The open nature of the wireless medium makes it rather difficult to implement commu-
nication protocols effectively. So far, there are few cognitive protocols that addresses the
1Channel acquisition in this context implies a network selecting an idle channel and maintaining control
of it as a preferred channel for transmission purposes while observing primary-secondary etiquette.
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problem of spectrum contention without significant message overhead and time delay due
to synchronization. In [22], 802.11 networks that are within radio range of each other are
required to synchronize their super frames. Via the transmission of coexistence beacons with
time stamps, the networks are able to adjust their super frames’ start times according to an
earlier agreed rules. A survey of MAC protocols for cognitive radio networks can be found
in [82]. The design of these proposed MAC protocols rely on control message exchange
and coordination to mitigate conflicts and boost performance. For instance, the adaptive
MAC (AMAC) protocol proposed in [54], with the ability to switch between CSMA and
TDMA schemes, involves significant control information overhead and latency. The goal of
AMAC is to improve performance relative to conventional system of static spectrum assign-
ment. In general, these protocols are not adaptive to a decentralized system with incomplete
information about various protocols implemented by the networks.
2.2 Multi-Channel Acquisition Heuristics
Since the application control messaging based protocols is inapplicable to decentralized sys-
tem of cognitive radio networks, we resolve to develop heuristics and mechanisms that will
enable networks to operate independently in a communication-free system. We borrow some
ideas from the TCP congestion control schemes which implements slow start and fast trans-
mit approaches. The design of TCP protocol is known support end-to-end connection but
does not provide means for end users to communicate congestion levels to one another [83].
Instead, the end users estimate congestion based on the feedback from the network and take
measures to reduce congestion. Just like the adjustment of the congestion window can help
control congestion in the network, we surmise that adjustment of the number of channels
acquired by a network could minimize contention and increase convergence. Also, the re-
duction in the number of channels sought for is carried out only after contention is detected
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and creates an opportunity for the network to “back-off” and consolidate its hold on chan-
nels with lesser contention. In the multi-channel acquisition scenario, we assume that the
networks maintain synchronized clocks. During the operational phase, otherwise known as
transmit phase, the networks “probe” the channels and record the feedback it receives about
their states2.
The general pseudocode for our multi-channel acquisition heuristic is presented in Al-
gorithm 1. At the beginning of any operational phase, a network selects a set of channels
si, consisting of k channels, to contend. Depending on the outcome of operation phase, the
network decides whether to increase or decrease k. An important feature of the heuristic
is the decision to either increase or decrease k. The channel requirement threshold τ is
used as a criteria in making this decision. It serves as a threshold to increase k linearly
or exponentially. The back-off mechanism is implemented by adjusting k whenever a net-
work experiences conflict with another network. The entire process of channel acquisition
terminates only when all networks have settled on their preferred channels 3 or otherwise
met their channel requirement mi with zero interference. When the networks have satisfied
their channel requirement, we say that the system has converged. The time required for the
system to converge is referred to as convergence time. It is an important parameter to ascer-
tain the performance of any given heuristic. We proceed to discuss the channel acquisition
heuristics and their characteristics.
We considered the following channel acquisition heuristics in our study: RENO, TAHOE,
Dynamic Incremental and Find-and-Keep heuristics. The first two heuristics are similar and
implements channel acquisition as described in algorithm 1. However, they differ in the way
spectrum contentions are handled.
2We assume that a channel can be in two different states - free and busy. A busy state indicates that a
channel is contended by an SU and not occupied by a PU.
3We assumed that the channels were homogeneous
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Algorithm 1 Multiple Channel Acquisition Heuristics
1: procedure channelAcquisition(s: set of available channels)
2: repeat
3: si ← select best channels from s, where |si| = k < mi
4: Transmit on si
5: if si ∩ s−i 6= ∅ then
6: k ← adjust by reducing k
7: τ ← channel requirement threshold τ (optional)
8: else
9: if k < τ then
10: Adjust by increasing k exponentially
11: else
12: k ← adjust by increasing k linearly
13: until k = mi and Φa(s) /* condition for convergence */
2.2.1 RENO Heuristics
The heuristics used in RENO heuristics is adopted from the TCP RENO congestion control
and avoidance mechanism. RENO mechanism defines the behavior of the network when it
does experience contention and when there is no contention. Upon experiencing contention
on any of the idle channels selected in the previous phase of channel selection, the network
reduces the number of channels it accesses in the current phase.
The manner in which the networks populate their channel set si depends on τ . As
mentioned above, the value of k is controlled by τ . As part of the heuristics the number of
channels acquired is increased exponentially until k < τ . The exponential acquisition enables
a network to build up quickly its channel set si with fewer steps with k = 1 at initialization.
k is increased linearly after the channel requirement threshold has been reached until k = mi
and zero conflict with other networks.
According to RENO heuristics, until the channel requirement threshold is reached, the
value of k is doubled, otherwise it is increased by 1. Therefore,
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k =
 2k if k < τk + 1 otherwise (2.1)
Assuming that Q(k) is a function that determines whether the channel threshold has
been exceeded, then we have that the next k is equivalent to
k ← 2k ·Q(k) + (k + 1) · (1−Q(k)) (2.2)
The outcome of the process of channel acquisition terminates when k = mi. In an attempt
to ensure quick convergence of the system, that is Φa(s) = 1, networks select the channel(s)
with the least potential of contention for transmission purposes. Later, we will present the
channel-ranking algorithm used by networks to select the best channels for transmission.
RENO heuristics handles contention by halving the number of channels k, that is k =
2−1k. The channel requirement threshold of the network is likewise reduced in the same
way τ = 2−1k such subsequent channel acquisition will carried out in a linear fashion. This
implies that upon the first incident of contention, the exponential increment would no longer
take place.
2.2.2 TAHOE Heuristics
TAHOE heuristics is very similar to that of RENO, except that it inherits some of its
specifics from TCP TAHOE collision avoidance algorithm. TAHOE mechanism implements
the same channel acquisition heuristics except that it handles contention differently. TAHOE
handles contention by reducing the number of channels that it currently has to one, that
is k = 1. The channel requirement threshold is set to τ = 2−1k. This means a network
implementing this heuristics restarts channel acquisition process with a single channel once
it encounters contention. If τ is still significant, then the network have a chance to increase
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k exponentially. Note that this type of back-off mechanism implemented in TAHOE is quite
extreme. However, unlike RENO where exponential increment of k is no longer possible after
the first contention, TAHOE heuristics allows for quick recovery from spectrum contention
since k < τ . In some special cases, τ can be fixed and left unmodified even with a network
experiencing contention.
2.2.3 LINEAR Heuristics
This channel acquisition heuristics does not make use of the channel requirement threshold τ .
Using this mechanism, a network acquires channel one at a time. An incident of contention
is followed by the relinquishment of a single channel. The heuristics may not guarantee
quick convergence but the steady pace of the acquisition process might help the network
avoid unnecessary conflict with other networks. LINEAR mechanism can be summarized as
follows
k ←
 k − 1 if si ∩ s−i 6= ∅k + 1 otherwise (2.3)
2.2.4 Dynamic Incremental Heuristics
Unlike the previously discussed heuristics, dynamic incremental heuristics relies on a ran-
domized process to decide the number of channels contended in every stage of the channel
acquisition process. The value of k for the next phase is dependent partly on the current
value of k and the difference in mi−k channels required to attain convergence. Suppose there
is a random function with uniformly distributed outcomes λ(·) such that λ(x) ∈ {0, x− 1}.
Then, the value of k is updated like this,
k = k + ∆k (2.4)
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where ∆k = δk±λ(δk) and δk = mi− k. In a case where the network is greedy, we have
∆k = δk + λ(δk). With such configuration and k = 0, the network is likely to contend for a
number of channels bounded by the following inequality mi ≤ k < 2mi. So equation (2.4)
can be re-written as
k = mi + λ(mi − k) (2.5)
By the equation, it becomes evident that the network goes for more channels that is
required. This approach might be greedy but it allows the network to probe the available
channel and discover which ones are left vacant. By this means, the network would be
able to gather more information about spectrum utilization. We can also observe that as
k → mi, the number of extra channels probed by the network decreases. Given a function
φ(k)that defines the outcome of every channel’s probe transmission, we have that the network
becomes satisfied only when φ(mi±λ(mi− k)) ≥ mi. With this heuristics, the networks are
not concerned about the amount of spectrum contentions before convergence. Rather they
are interested in satisfying channel requirement in every operational phase.
2.2.5 Find-and-Keep Heuristics
The approach used in Find-and-Keep (FAK) heuristics exploits the persistence of networks
to remain on a channel once found to be free. Technically, we assume cognitive radio net-
works can detect spectrum contentions with neighbors and make decision to switch or stay.
Equipped with this capability, networks are still unable to identify the source(s) of the con-
tentions experienced on a particular channel. As a result of this, networks have to make
proactive decision to remain on a channel or switch to another.
Sengupta et al. suggested a Nash equilibrium switching probability p, which if all net-
works switch with p upon experiencing contention, can lead to the convergence of the system.
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Making a decision to stay or switch for a multiple number of channels is expensive, consider-
ing the switching cost. The approach involves networks hopping aimlessly over the available
channels with no preference for any particular channel.
The FAK heuristics is designed to minimize the cost of switching and encourages the
maintenance of preferential list of channels, just like the aforementioned heuristics. Thus,
when a network finds a idle channel, it stays on the channel with a probability q ≈ 1, and
switches with p ≈ 0, where 0 ≤ p, q ≤ 1 and p + q = 1. Any time when contention is
recorded on a particular channel, q undergoes an exponential decay. Suppose qo is the initial
probability of selecting a newly found idle channel. After τ spectrum contentions on that
channel, we may have the probability to stay updated as follows:
qτ = qo · e−λτ = qo · e−τ/T (2.6)
And in a case, where we substitute qo with qτ after every update, we have
qτ = qo · e−τ(τ+1)/T (2.7)
Note that λ = 1/T is the decay rate of the stay probability q and the T is the time
required for q to decay to an amount equivalent to 1/e of its initial value qo. Equation (2.7)
is more appropriate for cases where a network is sensitive to contentions and want q to decay
faster with fewer contentions. This allows the network to explore other channels without
having to be strictly attached to the first discovered channel(s). A necessary criteria for the
convergence of the system is that m ≥ n, otherwise the system will never converge. When
m < n and each network needs a channel to operate, then the system needs at least n−m
channels to ensure that each network gets at least a single channel to operate.
FAK heuristics has numerous advantages, which favors convergence time of the system.
The mechanism operates on the first come first serve principle. The first network to identify
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Algorithm 2 Find-and-keep heuristics
1: procedure findandkeep
2: Initialize ~q ← 0
3: repeat
4: - - Channel Selection Phase
5: for Ni ∈ N do
6: if sti is Empty then
7: st+1i ← select mi channels u.a.r from C = {cj : j = 1, 2, · · · ,m}
8: else
9: st+1i ← select cj from sti with qij
10: if |st+1i | < mi then
11: st+1i ← st+1i
⋃
select k = mi − |st+1i | channels u.a.r from C \ sti
12:
13: - - Channel Stay Probability Update Phase
14: for Ni ∈ N do
15: for cj ∈ st+1i do
16: if I(cj) == 0 then - - zero interference/contention
17: τij ← 0
18: qij ← 0.99
19: else
20: τij ← τij + 1






an idle channel literally sticks to it but with an exponentially decreasing probability q. This
makes it difficult to displace the first network to arrive on the channel with fewer contentions.
The number of contentions required to displace a network is equivalent to the inverse of the
decay rate 1/λ. Spectrum contenders that are yet to satisfy their channel requirement must
then perform channel hopping to find idle channels that are yet to be acquired. Assuming
that there are n networks in the system. In the first round of channel acquisition process,
half of the network could have settled on some idle channels. Assuming that in every round
approximately half of the networks find a channel idle and settle on them, then it will take
approximately O(log(n)) time for the system to converge.
FAK heuristics is also robust to the emergence or departure of a network during the
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channel acquisition process. The first come first serve principle ensures that the emergence
of new networks in the spectrum environment does not disrupt or displace already settled
networks. An incoming network have to hop over the channels, probing for the idle bands,
thereby minimizing the number of spectrum contentions needed to stabilize the system.
The departure of a network from spectrum environment does not affect disrupt normal
spectrum operation. Rather, it creates an opportunity for unsatisfied networks to acquire
those channels left by the departing networks. The FAK heuristics is memory-less. Once a
channel is found to be idle, the probability of a network remaining on the channel becomes
significant. Previous information about secondary users activities on the newly found channel
are overridden by the fact the channel is available for use in transmission.
2.3 Channel Ranking Algorithm
The channel ranking algorithm is used during the acquisition process to determine which
channels to select for the acquisition process. The decision to operate on a certain set of
channels must be based on how successful operations on those channels have been in the
recent past. Contention is likely to occur on any of the m available channels since selections
made by neighboring networks are not communicated. In that case, it would be important
to choose channels with high success rate. Success rate can be measured in terms of the
number of successful probe transmissions carried out by the network after sensing a channel
to be idle.
We have made the assumption that channels are homogeneous in terms of spectrum
capacity, so no one channel is better than the other. By probing the spectrum environment,
the networks are able to gather profile information about available set of channels. Profile
information gathered are marked by channel identity Cj, number of successful attempts u,
and number of failed attempts v. The number of failed attempts v also includes the frequency
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of PU activity on the channel on the select channel.
We proceed to describe how the channel-ranking algorithm works. The algorithm is
designed such that normalized success rate µ is used in sorting the channel ids until enough
channel profile information have been gathered. Sorting is carried out in descending order
such that the first channel id has the best success rate. If there are m channels, µj would
denote the success rate of channel Cj. Initially, for all channel uj = 1 to avoid division by
zero during the normalization. A network decides the length of time in time slots T during
which it will be using the normalized approach for channel ranking. After T time slots,
subsequent ranking is based on the ratio of uj to the uj + vj. A summary of the channel
ranking rules are presented below:
1. At any time t < T , success rate µj is defined as µj = uj/
∑
l ul
2. At any time t ≥ T , success rate µj is defined as µ = uj/(uj + vj).
3. Channel cj is prioritize over channel ck, if µj > µk.
4. In case µj = µk, channels according to the uniformly at random order of selection from
the resulting channel set {cj, ck}.
The parameter T , indicating the length of the probing period, is strictly network-defined.
Depending on the priority of the network, T , whether to learn more about the channels, it
can decide to set the value of T to be small or large. According to the first rule, µj measures
the relative performance or the availability of Cj with respect to other channels. The second
rule, on the other hand, treats µj as a measure strictly based on history of actual experience
on Cj. Both measures can be combined to get global view about the performance of a
particular channel. In that case, we have µj defined as follows,
µj = α · uj∑
j uj
+ (1− α) · uj
uj + vj
(2.8)
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where α ∈ 0 and a ∈ R is a coefficient of relative importance of the two measures. As a
matter fact, when there is lack of history on the channel set, the relative performance takes
precedence over individual channel performance, so α = 1. As a result, a network can decide
to keep α = 1 up until T time slots has elapsed and then switch to individual performance
assessment by setting α = 0. As an alternative approach, the value of α can be allowed to
decay gradually by a certain quantum of change. Using this approach, the significance of the
relative performance measure diminishes gradually until enough channel profile information
has been gathered. The channel ranking scheme ensures that channels with high µ values
are selected in preference.
2.4 Estimating Spectrum Contention on a Channel
As part of our studies, we analyzed spectrum contention as it pertains to conflicts expe-
rienced in cognitive radio systems. Since cognitive radios rely on opportunistic access of
idle frequency bands, they often encounter conflict during spectrum access. It is therefore
imperative to estimate the severity of spectrum contention based on important features of
the system such as the number of networks and available frequency bands in the system.
When spectrum contention takes place between two networks knowingly or unknowingly, it
produces interference, which does not benefit any of the networks. We mentioned earlier that
spectrum contention could be used as a strategy to maintain control of a channel. However,
the effectiveness of such strategy depends on the homogeneity of the frequency bands as well
as the system characteristics.
Given certain information, such as number of networks in the system and number of
available channels, we can probably estimate the chances of spectrum contention occurring.
We proceed to derive the probability of two or more networks contending on the same
channel.
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Theorem 2.4.1. Given m and n as positive discrete integers and Dn denoting an event
where 2 or more cognitive radio networks contend a single channel, then probability that
event Dn occurs is defined
Pr{Dn} ≥ 1− e
−n(n−1)
2m
Proof. To prove this theorem, we resort to the well-known birthday paradox problem. The
birthday paradox problem addresses the probability that, in a given set of individuals, some
pair of individuals were born on the same day. We used the same approach used in T. H.
Cormen et. al, to derive the probability Pr{Dn} of two or more networks contending the
same channel. Let ci denote the identity of the channel accessed by Ni out of m available
channels. The probability that any two networks Ni and Nj contends on a given channel
with identity c, assuming independence of the choices made by the networks, is given as
Pr{ci = c, cj = c} = Pr{ci = c} · Pr{cj = c} = 1/m2 (2.9)
Therefore, the probability that any choice made by the two networks coincide is
Pr{ci = cj} =
∑
c∈C
Pr{ci = c, cj = c} =
∑
c∈C
1/m2 = 1/m (2.10)
Further, we can analyze the probability of at least two out of n contends on the same
channel by looking at the complimentary events. The probability of at least two networks
contending is same as one minus the probability that no network contends with another,
that is zero contention. We define an event Ai that Ni’s choice is distinct from any other Nj





According to Bayes theorem and applying the commutative law for two events with non-
CHAPTER 2. CHANNEL ACQUISITION IN COGNITIVE RADIO NETWORKS 35
zero probability, we can write Bn = An ∩Bn−1 as a recurrence
Pr{Bn} = Pr{Bn−1} · Pr{An|Bn−1} (2.12)
where we take the base case as Pr{B1} = Pr{A1} = 1. Therefore, the choices made
by the n networks are distinct only if the sequence c1, c2, · · · , cn are distinct. This is equiv-
alent to the probability that cn 6= ci for i = 1, 2, · · · , n − 1 times the probability that the
c1, c2, · · · , cn−1 are distinct. This is possible only if Pr{An|Bn−1} = (m − n + 1)/m, since
out of m channels, m− n+ 1 channels have already been selected by n− 1 networks. Upon
expanding the recurrence, we have
















For all x ∈ R, we have ex ≥ 1 + x. Thus,
Pr{Bn} ≤ e−1/me−2/m · · · e−(n−1)/m = e−n(n−1)/2m (2.14)
From the above expression, we can state that the probability of contention Pr{Dn}, given
that Dn is the event that at least two networks contends, is
Pr{Dn} ≥ 1− e−n(n−1)/2m (2.15)
From inequality 2.15, we can observe that to minimize contention amounts to minimizing
Pr{Dn}. This, in turn, implies maximizing the exponential component that is −n(n −
1)/2m = 0. Solving the equation shows that contention is inevitable, except when there is
zero or a single network present in the system.
Corollary 2.4.2. Suppose that m1 and m2 are distinct non-zero positive integers such that
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m2 > m1. Also, suppose that n is constant and Pr{Dkn} denotes Pr{Dn} for a case where
there are only k channels available. Then,
Pr{Dm1n } > Pr{Dm2n }
Proof. From equation (2.15), we can approximate Pr{Dn} to be
Pr{Dn} = 1− e−n(n−1)/2m (2.16)
which in other words can be simply interpreted as the lower bound for spectrum contention




This implies that with more channels, the probability of spectrum contention tends to zero.
Therefore, a system with just m1 channels is likely to experience more spectrum contention
than a system with m2 available channels, given that m2 > m1. Thus, it is valid to state
that
Pr{Dm1n } > Pr{Dm2n }
Corollary 2.4.3. Suppose that the number of networks n is variable, with entry or departure
of k networks, amid fixed spectrum resources m. For any 0 < k ≤ n
1. Pr{Dn} ≥ Pr{Dn−k}
2. Pr{Dn} < Pr{Dn+k}.
Proof. To proof the above statement, we begin by looking at the first case. We can interpret
this case as being similar to a scenario of k networks leaving the system. This is an indication
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So a reduction in n, actually reduces the level of spectrum contention to expect in the system,
Considering the constraints stated earlier, we have that n(n− 1) > (n− k)(n− k − 1) and
subsequently −n(n− 1) < −(n− k)(n− k − 1). This implies that
e−n(n−1)/2m < e−(n−k)(n−k−1)/2m
1− e−n(n−1)/2m > 1− e−(n−k)(n−k−1)/2m
With the transformation, it leads us to conclude that
Pr{Dn} ≥ Pr{Dn−k}
The equality sign, seen in the above inequality expression, explains the possibility of the
departure not contributing to significant improvement in spectrum contention. This is very
likely to happen in a system where k  n.
In a similar way, we can show that Pr{Dn} < Pr{Dn+k}, since an increase in the number
of networks by k would create more demand for spectrum resources.
Theorem 2.4.4. Assuming a cognitive radio network system is characterized by n ∈ Z+ net-
works and m ∈ Z+ channels and a random variable Z that denotes the number of contending




defines expected number of contending network pairs involved in spectrum contention.
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Proof. We can analyze the expectation of spectrum contention in a given cognitive radio
network system by taking into account the expected number of networks that will choose
the same channel, given the homogeneity of the channels. Let us represent the choices made
by any two independent networks Ni and Nj with an indicator random variable Zij, defined
as
Zij = I{ci = cj} =
 1 ci = cj0 otherwise
where ci and cj are the choices of Ni and Nj respectively. Considering equation (2.10), we
have the expectation of the random variable Zij being E[Zij] = 1/m. Let the number of




































Thus, if n(n − 1) ≥ 2m, then E[Z] ≥ 1. This implies that at least two networks will be
contending for a single channel.
In a case, where n = m with single channel requirement per network, we have that the
expected number of pairwise contention is equal to (m− 1)/2. This shows that even in the
face of adequate number of channels to satisfy the networks’ channel requirements, they can
still experience contention if the system is decentralized. Even when there are
√
2m + 1
networks in the system, we can still expect that at least two networks will contend for the
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same channel.
Earlier, we described the event Dn as an event where at least two networks contend
the same channel. Thus, Pr{Dn} describes the probability that at least two networks will
conflict in an attempt to acquire a channel. To determine the distribution of the spectrum
contention, we define a random variable X that denotes the number of networks contending
for the same channel. Thus, equation (2.15) can be rewritten as follows:
Pr{Dn} = Pr{1 < X ≤ n} (2.20)
We recognize that Pr{Dn} is defined for a closed range [1, n] and fits into the definition
of a cumulative distribution function FX(x), where sup{x ∈ Z+} = n, given that




We note also that FX(x) = 0 for all x ≤ 1, since in the context of our spectrum contention
analysis, contention can take place with the involvement of at least two networks.
Definition 1. A function is a cumulative distribution function (CDF) of a random variable
X if i) non-decreasing ii) right continuous iii) limx→0 F (x) = 0 and iv) limx→∞ F (x) = 1.
Lemma 2.4.5. The function FX(x) = 1− e−x(x−1)2m is the cumulative distribution function of
the random variable X, where x ∈ [0,+∞] and m is a constant.
Proof. The function FX(x) is inherently a non-decreasing function, because for any given
pair of numbers a and b, with b > a, FX(b) > FX(a). Likewise, we can show that FX(x) is
right continuous. For any given c ∈ [2,+∞], we have that
lim
x→c
FX(x) = 1− e
−c(c−1)
2m = FX(c) (2.22)
This implies that the limit of FX(x) as x approaches c exists and equals to the value of FX(x)
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1− e−x(x−1)2m = 0 (2.23)





1− e−x(x−1)2m = 1 (2.24)













such that fX(x) = F
′
X(x). Since the CDF is right continuous, we can rewrite, equation (2.25)





To derive fX(n) we need to differentiate L.H.S of equation (2.15), assuming that the CDF
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Figure 2.2: Cumulative distribution function of n coexisting networks with m = 12 channels.




















To test and compare the performance of the proposed mechanisms for multiple channel ac-
quisition, we conducted extensive simulation experiments. The goal of the experiments was
to generate and test spectrum contention model that resemble real-world scenario. The
simulation model was programmed to emulate the sensing and transmission operations per-
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Figure 2.3: Projected probability distribution function of n coexisting networks with m = 12
channels.
formed by cognitive radio transmitters during normal spectrum activity. Spectrum access is
synchronized in frames. Each frame is partitioned into beacon phase and data transmission
phase. Networks perform sensing during the beacon phase and transmit during the data
transmission phase. Spectrum sensing is enabled to ensure that all networks adhere to spec-
trum etiquette and avoid any interference with primary users. During the data transmission
phase, network attempts transmission over one or more channels. Transmission fails when
at least two networks transmit over the same channel. We assume that networks have the
ability to detect such failed transmissions, and consequently infer spectrum contention.
The main performance metrics used in comparing the mechanisms are convergence time,
average system utility and contention. Convergence is achieved when all networks in the
system have settled on their preferred channels or spectrum bands and are no longer con-
tending each other. Convergence time is thus defined as the number of time slots or frames
required for the system to attain stability. Depending on primary user rate of activity and
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available spectrum, we anticipate an exponential increase in convergence time as the number
of networks increases. The average simulation time for our experiment was limited to 1000
time slots/frames. In order to capture the average performance trend for each mechanism,
we repeated the experiment 1000 times.
To provide a fair comparison of the different mechanisms, we adopt the same network
setting throughout the experiment. In our experimental setup, we assume an average channel
requirement for each network and ensure that the available channels are sufficient enough to
satisfy the networks. As a result, the experiments were conducted in two different network
settings - small and large network. For small network setting, the configuration is such that
the average channel requirement k = 2 and the total number of available channels m = 20,
with at most n = 10 independent networks. The large network setting, on the other hand,
has k = 5 and m = 200, with at most n = 30 independent networks.
We present the results obtained from our experiments in two sub-sections. First, we
present results obtained during our earlier investigation into multiple channel acquisition in
DSA systems. The heuristics studied and analyzed at that stage include RENO, TAHOE,
LINEAR and Increment Probabilistic heuristics (INCR). Later, we present the find-and-keep
heuristics, which is the latest addition to the pool of heuristics for multiple channel acqui-
sition heuristics. We compare find-and-keep heuristics to the communication-free learning
algorithm using the convergence time performance metric.
2.5.1 Experimental Results I
In this section, we present the results obtained from our investigation into the nature of
multiple channel acquisition in cognitive radio networks. The experimental setup had the
following configuration. Networks shared a total of m = 225 channels with an average
channel requirement per network k = 5. Each network has channel size requirement, which
serves as a threshold to acquire channels linearly or exponentially. We configure the networks
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to have the same channel size requirement. RENO and TAHOE heuristics make use of this
parameter in their respective implementations. However, the threshold parameter is not
used in LINEAR and INCR heuristics.
The simulations were conducted in two different modes: primary users present and pri-
mary users absent. In the simulation involving primary users, primary user activity was
modeled using Markov chain. A channel goes from idle to busy due to primary user activity
with a probability of 0.1. The average channel occupancy follows Poisson distribution with
a mean value of 10 time slots/frames. The performance metrics used in the experiment
are utility, convergence time and contention based on the number of networks or available
channels. All metrics are measured in time slots.
System Utility
System utility is measured in terms of the number of time slots or frames during which a
network was able to operate in an interference-free channel. We assume that the transmitted
information is delay tolerant but has to retain its data integrity. Therefore, any form of
interference during active transmission on the channel renders the information inaccurately,
thereby reducing the utility to zero. This implies that no partial benefit can be derived even
if part of the transmitted data were delivered.
Performance comparison of the heuristics, based on system utility in the absence of the
primary users, is illustrated in Figure 2.4, where x-axis denotes the number of networks in
the system and the y-axis denote system utility, measured in time slots. We can observe
that the INCR heuristics gives the best performance. Performance of INCR heuristics can
be attributed to its slightly greedy approach in channel acquisition. Networks implementing
this mechanism consistently select a random number of channels to contend. In some cases,
the number of channels selected might actually exceed the channel requirement. The other
heuristics (TAHOE, RENO, LINEAR) apply a step-wise approach in selecting channels,
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and implement back-off mechanism by slicing the channel size requirement upon experienc-
ing contention. LINEAR gives a better performance than RENO and TAHOE mechanisms
because the mechanism adopts a “slow and steady” approach in acquiring channels. The
poorer performance of RENO and TAHOE can be attributed to the contention avoidance
measure of halving channel size whenever there is contention. TAHOE mechanisms poor
performance can be attributed to the drastic reduction in the number of acquired channel
after contention. Even though with subsequent successful transmissions, followed by an ex-
ponential increase in channel size (up until channel size threshold is reached), the mechanism
may not be effective in helping the network recover as fast as RENO.
Figure 2.4: The diagram describes the expected system utility in a case where primary users
absent in the spectrum.
Generally, we can observe that system utility increases as the number of networks in-
creases. However, the observable trends are accounted for by the sufficient supply of channels
and not as a result of number of networks. With sufficient supply of channels, the conver-
gence time is shorter and therefore networks able to begin interference-free transmission
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earlier. Given a certain number of networks n, we expect that with an average channel size
requirement k, the expected system utility is equivalent to n ·k ·T , where T is the number of
observed transmission time slots/frames. We examine the ratio of the actual system utility
derived to the expected system utility and how it relates to n and the utilization rate of the
available channels.
Figure 2.5: A plot that illustrates actual to expected ratio of system utility and variations
in utilization rate with regards to available spectrum resources.
An illustration of the ratio of actual system utility to expected system utility can be
seen in Figure 2.5. We expect actual system utility to be less than or equal to the expected
utility. However, this condition does not hold for INCR heuristics. This is because networks
might end with more channels than the channel size requirement. We can also observe that
as the utilization rate increase, the possibly of system implementing INCR to acheive a ratio
greater than one diminishes.
The presence of primary user in the system has negative impact on the system utility. In
Figure 2.6, we compared the performance of INCR heuristics in the absence and presence of
primary users. We can observe a decrease in system utility as a result of primary presence.
The system utility decreased by average of 8%.
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Figure 2.6: Performance comparison of INCR heuristics as it applies in the absence and
presence of primary users.
System Contention
While the system utility is an important performance measure, it is also important have an
insight on the number of spectrum contentions observed in the system. In our simulation
settings, contention is measured in terms of the number of time slots wasted when networks
select the same channel. In other words, spectrum contentions are measured in terms of the
number of channels with records of conflicts and not the number of conflicting networks.
Spectrum contention ceases when networks have acquired the channel size requirement and
no longer contending with other networks. Figure 2.7 illustrates the variation spectrum
contention with n.
We observe that as the network density increases, with limited supply of channels, the
number of spectrum contentions in the system increases. Figure 2.7 shows that the INCR
does better than other heuristics, until n > 27. RENO and TAHOE outperforms LINEAR
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Figure 2.7: Variation of spectrum contention with the number of networks.
for n > 20, and even better than INCR when n ≥ 28. The backoff-mechanism employed by
RENO and TAHOE pays off, with the networks encountering less conflicts than LINEAR
and INCR. The persistent nature of INCR makes it highly vulnerable to contentions as n
increases. By comparing the utility derived per contention experienced in the system, we
have a completely different picture of the performance of the heuristics.
Figure 2.8: An illustration of the utility per contention experienced in the system. This
shows that for a large system of networks, utility-per-contention is invariant to the heuristics
implemented.
In Figure 2.8, we observe that the utility per contention decreases and converges towards
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zero as n increases. The causative factor for such trend is the increased utilization rate,
which reduces the abundance of spectrum resources exists with smaller n. With increasing
channel requirement, the networks have to contend as much as the amount of utility that they
derive from available fixed spectrum resources. This implies that the utility per contention
measure is invariant to the heuristics implemented in the system. However, INCR offers the
best performance when compared to other networks when n ≤ 25.
Convergence Time
Convergence time is the number of time slots/frames that elapsed before the networks sat-
isfied the channel size requirement. Convergence time is dependent on a number of factors,
including the presence of primary users and the number of available channels, and the density
of the system with regards to the average allocation per network.
Figure 2.9: Convergence time of multiple channel acquisition heuristics with primary user
absent.
Figure 2.9 illustrates the dependency of convergence time on the number of networks.
We can observe that convergence time is a non-decreasing function of n. As the number
of networks in the system increase, it becomes rather difficult for networks to satisfy their
channel requirement. In our simulation settings, the number of available channel is set to
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m = 225. With some heuristics, the system never converges within the simulation time
T = 1000 with 50% utilization rate. The INCR heuristic gives the fastest convergence time.
Figure 2.10: Impact of primary users presence on the convergence times of RENO and
LINEAR heuristics.
Depending on the rate of primary user activities, it might take the system additional time
to converge. With networks getting displaced from acquired channels, and near-stable state
of the system can be upset. We show the impact of primary user presence by comparing the
convergence times of RENO in the absence and presence of primary users. The convergence
time curve is shifted to left, indicating a slower convergence rate.
2.5.2 Experimental Results II
Convergence Time
Experiments were conducted to compare the performance of the multiple channel acqui-
sition heuristics discussed in section 2.5.1, the find-and-keep (FAK) heuristics and the
communication-free learning (CFL) algorithm. In comparing the heuristics, we ensured that
the configurations were the same for all experimental setup. For instance, the simulation
time was set at 1000 time slots, the average channel size requirement k = 5 and the number
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of available channels m = 225. We observed the performance as the system’s size increases.
Figure 2.11 shows the convergence time trend for all heuristics discussed.
Figure 2.11: Comparison of all proposed multiple channel acquisition heuristics with CFL
based on convergence time.
Based on the illustration, we observe that FAK outperforms all heuristics with fast con-
vergence time. Provided the available channel supply is sufficient to satisfy each networks
channel size requirement, a system implementing FAK is guaranteed to converge. FAK con-
verges very fast with convergence time under 100 time slots. This performance is attributed
to the basic idea of the heuristics. According to the heuristics, a network to hold onto a
channel after discovering it as contention-free. It relinquishes the channel with a probability
that only increases (exponentially) when contention is being experienced on that channel
increases. Unlike in the CFL algorithm, where the probability distributions’ updates are fol-
lowed by normalization, FAK employs exponentially decay approach during updates and do
normalize across distributions. It is worth noting that INCR competes with CFL, producing
almost the same convergence time trend as CFL.
In Figure 2.12, we present a strict performance comparison of the CFL and FAK with a
constraint such that m = k · n. This implies that the exact number of channels required to
satisfy each networks is available or the utilization rate is 1.0. We studied cases where k = 1
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and k = 2 to show the strengths of the two heuristics being compared.
Figure 2.12: Comparison of CFL and FAK heuristics with the system having the exact
number of channels to satisfy the networks’ channel size requirements.
We can observe that CFL is more suitable for channel acquisition than FAK when k = 1.
While CFL converges faster when k = 1, FAK converges faster than CFL when k = 2. For
the case where k = 2, CFL’s convergence becomes non-deterministic when n > 20. On the
contrary, FAK is more scalable, converging faster and even further up until n > 25. For single
channel acquisition, both FAK and CFL guarantee convergence of the system, irrespective
of the increase in system size.
Impact of System Size on Convergence
In previous section, we provided results for multiple channel acquisition for large system of
networks. Here, we show the results obtained for both small and large system of networks.
The results show the comparisons of our FAK heuristics with CFL, which is self-acclaimed
as the fastest channel selection heuristics in recent works. As a result, our focus will be
based more on convergence time and the amount of contentions experienced in the system.
The small network setting has a configuration where k = 2, m = 20 and 5 ≤ n ≤ 10, while
the large network setting has k = 5, m = 200 and 5 ≤ n ≤ 30.
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Figure 2.13: Performance comparison of CFL and FAK algorithms based on convergence
time in small network configuration
Figure 2.14: Performance comparison of CFL and FAK algorithms based on convergence
time in large network configuration.
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Figure 2.15: Comparison of spectrum contention in CFL to their worst case of spectrum
contention
Spectrum Contention
We investigated how CFL and FAK heuristics performed in terms of the number of spectrum
contentions observed during implementation. The actual number of spectrum contentions
is compared to the expected number of spectrum contention in the worst-case scenario.
The expected number of spectrum contentions in the worst scenario is derived by assuming
that contentions occurred through out the time that it would normally take the system to
converge. We observed that in the case of FAK, the system registered far less number of
spectrum contentions with only 9% of expected number of spectrum contention in the worst
case scenario. On the other hand, the system, implementing CFL, registered high level of
spectrum contentions and experienced, on average, 16% of expected number of spectrum
contentions in the worst case scenario.
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Figure 2.16: Comparison of spectrum contention in FAK to their worst case of spectrum
contention.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we discussed heuristics for multiple channel acquisition. The proposed
heuristics offers decentralized solution to the problem of self-coexistence of cognitive radio
networks. CR networks that operate in a spectral environment where communication is
constrained can implement any of the proposed heuristics. We have presented an argument
that control messaging is inapplicable in a decentralized system that lacks centralized control
and embodied with communication constraints. Networks operating in such systems do not
have sufficient knowledge of spectrum choices made by their neighbors. Given the dynamic
nature of the spectrum and the cost of setting up control channels, a befitting solution for
channel selection or acquisition should employ a decentralized approach.
The proposed multiple channel acquisition heuristics implement decentralized mecha-
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nisms that require no coordination among networks in the system. Our proposed channel
selection scheme ensures that the best channels are selected based on channel profile history.
Some of the heuristics like RENO and TAHOE implement back-of mechanisms that allow
them to avoid contention and maintain system utility. We also show that the performances
of the heuristics are quite consistent and fairly robust to rare primary user presence in the
spectrum.
We compared the performance of our heuristics to the CFL algorithm. We found INCR
and FAK heuristics can contend with the CFL algorithm in terms of convergence time. CFL
algorithm is best suited for single channel acquisition cases, while FAK converges faster in
multiple channel acquisition. FAK algorithm is also scalable with respect to the number
of networks, showing better convergence compared to CFL. FAK algorithm guarantees the
convergence of the system, provided there exists a spectrum allocation that satisfies the
channel size requirements of the contending CR networks.
In conclusion, we emphasize that the multiple channel acquisition heuristics are well
suited for such wireless network scenarios where there is no prior knowledge of channel
availability and no history profile about both primary and secondary users activities. The
heuristics are also adaptable to scenarios where cognitive radio networks cannot exchange
control messages to avoid contention with one another. The heuristics are quite simple to
implement, efficient and inexpensive. There is no overhead cost due to messaging, and the
memory cost is quite insignificant.
Chapter 3
Distributed and Cheat-proof
Spectrum Contention Scheme for
IEEE 802.22 Wireless Regional Area
Networks
3.1 Introduction
The adaptive On-Demand Spectrum Contention (ODSC) protocol is a self-coexistence ori-
ented protocol, designed specifically for WRAN networks [58] [59]. The ODSC protocol
leverages the MAC messaging on the inter-network communication channel to provide inter-
network spectrum sharing among coexisting WRAN networks. The protocol is designed
to allow WRAN networks to compete for shared spectrum by simply exchanging and com-
paring randomly generated contention priority numbers (CPNs). Several flaws have been
identified with the ODSC protocol, which can jeopardize the fairness guarantees and also
impact negatively on system performance. ODSC protocol is prone to random number gen-
57
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Figure 3.1: Finite state machine diagram of spectrum contention in 802.22 WRAN networks.
erator manipulation, where participants can manipulate the generated CPNs in order to win
the contention process. The contention destination can easily ignore or overlook the ODSC
request sent by contention sources and declare itself the winner of the contention process.
Given the above scenarios, it becomes possible for one or more participants to “hijack” avail-
able spectrum resources, thereby eroding the fairness that the ODSC protocol was designed
to provide.
In this chapter, we address vulnerabilities associated with the ODSC protocol. We pro-
pose a modified version of the protocol that mitigates the possibility of CPN manipulation by
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spectrum contenders, thereby promoting fairness and self-coexistence. We also investigate
and propose ways to improve system utility, leveraging the proposed spectrum contention
scheme.
3.2 System Model
Consider a typical deployment scenario of multiple WRAN networks, each consisting of
a base station (BS) and related customer premise equipment (CPE). The communication
range of a WRAN network could extend up to 100 km [26] [84] and may overlap with other
WRAN networks in its vicinity. Spectrum resources that are not being used by the licensed
incumbents are allocated in such a way as to mitigate interference during the operation of
the WRAN networks. A typical deployment of WRAN networks is illustrated in Figure 3.2.
Suppose there are n IEEE 802.22 WRAN networks in the system. The BSs of these networks
participate in spectrum contention to gain access to a specific channel. The system of WRAN
networks can be represented as an undirected interference or conflict graph G = {N,E}
where N = {Ni} is the set of vertices denoting the WRAN networks and n = |N |. E is a set
of undirected edges denoting the existence of interference constraints existing between any
given two networks. For instance, if an edge (i, k) exists in E for a channel Cj, then both Ni
and Nk cannot operate simultaneously on channel Cj without interference. Assuming Nk is
the contention destination currently occupying channel Cj, then possible contenders or set
of contention sources is defined as the set N c = N \Nk ∪ {Ni : (i, k) ∈ E}.
We assume that in the system, there are m available channels. Each channel is partitioned
into synchronized superframes which is further partitioned into 16 frames of fixed length.
Each frame is further divided into Data Transmission Period (DTP) and Beacon Period
(BP) just like in CBP protocol [26]. Availability of the channels is time-variant and largely
dependent on the activities of the licensed incumbents. Without loss of generality, we assume
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Figure 3.2: A typical system of WRAN networks
that all WRAN networks are aware of the system topology that imposes the operational
constraints on the use of the available frequency bands. Primary-secondary etiquette is
strictly observed in the system. The secondary-secondary etiquette is enforced by allowing
WRAN networks to request spectrum contention instead of blindly grabbing any available
channel for transmission. Utility derived by WRAN networks is dependent on the throughput
obtained while operating on the channels. We assume that when two WRAN networks are
in close proximity and transmitting on the same frequency band(s), interference will occur.
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As a result, no utility is derived since the interference could exceed the signal to interference
and noise ratio (SINR) requirements, causing the transmissions to fail [59].
3.3 On-Demand Spectrum Contention Protocol
On-demand spectrum contention (ODSC) protocol is a distributed, cooperative, and real-
time spectrum sharing protocol. The fundamental idea of the protocol is based on allowing
BSs of coexisting WRAN networks to contend for shared spectrum resources on an on-
demand basis [26]. Figure 3.3 shows the conventional ODSC protocol as described by Hu et
al. in [26].
The ODSC scheme works as follows. An occupant of a channel, referred to as con-
tention destination (DST), regularly send ODSC announcement messages (ODSC ANN),
informing neighbors of the occupied channel. A spectrum-demanding network, also known
as contention source (SRC), upon receiving such announcements prepares an ODSC request
message (ODSC REQ) and forwards it to a randomly selected DST.
The ODSC REQ message includes a CPN which can be either a real number uniformly
selected from the range [0, 1] or an integer selected uniformly at random from the range
[0, 2x − 1] with x being an arbitrary integer generally accepted in the system. DSTs also
maintain an ODSC REQ window during which they expect to receive ODSC REQ from
channel contenders. At the end of the ODSC REQ window, if any ODSC REQ was received,
a DST network generates a CPN and compares it with the CPNs from other SRCs.
When a DST network receives the CPNs, it proceeds to aggregate them and decide the
winner based on the spectrum contention resolution scheme adopted in the system. Once the
spectrum contention decision is made, DST network sends out an ODSC response message
(ODSC RSP), appending the identity of the spectrum contention winner. Suppose that the
criteria for winning spectrum contention in the system are based on contender with the
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Figure 3.3: A diagram illustrating conventional ODSC protocol.
smallest CPN wins. If a DST network’s CPN is the smallest (highest priority) among all
CPNs compared, then it will send an ODSC RSP message to all SRC networks indicating
contention failure. Otherwise, winner SRC network will receive an ODSC RSP indicating
contention success while other SRC networks receives messages indicating contention failure.
The winner SRC then sends an acknowledgement message (ODSC ACK) indicating the time
when it intends to acquire the contended channel. A channel release is scheduled by all DST
networks operating within operating range of the winner SRC network via an ODSC release
message (ODSC REL). ODSC REL specifies the channel to be released, the channel release
time and winner SRC network’s identification.
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3.3.1 Vulnerabilities of ODSC Protocol
ODSC protocol is far from a perfect protocol for fostering self-coexistence of WRAN net-
works. We can identify some of the loopholes in the protocol design that could jeopardize
self-coexistence among the networks. Some of the assumptions made in ODSC protocol
include:
1. CPNs are actually generated uniformly at random from the range specified and agreed
upon by the system of WRAN networks;
2. DSTs, serving as arbiters during spectrum contention processes, are honest and unbi-
ased;
3. CPN collisions are rare or practically impossible.
The first assumption deals with the generation of the CPNs used in spectrum contentions.
Prior to the deployment of the WRAN networks, a decision is reached on the criteria used
in deciding the winner of a spectrum contention. With this information, the BSs might be
tempted to manipulate their CPNs in order to win the contention. The second assumption
grants unlimited authority to incumbent DSTs to decide the outcome of spectrum con-
tentions. DSTs can reach decisions in favor of themselves, regardless of the CPNs sent by
SRCs. Even though the possibility of CPN collisions is quite negligible depending on the
range w = 2x, it is still important to address such situations. In the ODSC system, a
criterion is usually adopted for spectrum contention resolution; for instance the owner of
the smallest CPN wins. With this knowledge, some contenders might decide to generate
the smallest possible CPN value in order to win a spectrum contention. This makes CPN
collisions more frequent. The best approach to conduct spectrum contention is to hide the
criterion for spectrum contention resolution from participants, thereby forcing them to use
random CPN generators. However, this approach still leaves loopholes in ODSC because
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DSTs still reserve the right to: 1) decide the criterion; and 2) announce the winner of the
spectrum contention. Also the protocol fails to consider repeated spectrum contentions that
can lead to channel reuse, which can improve efficiency of spectrum utilization.
3.4 Modified ODSC Protocol
We propose a distributed and cheat-proof spectrum contention protocol, otherwise known
as Modified ODSC. MODSC addresses issues related to the ODSC protocol. Our approach
supports an open and distributed decision-making process, which involves every network
contender. Also, it eliminates the need for a fixed range in generating CPN numbers, such
that CPNs can be any number within the interval [0,∞]. As we have stated earlier, spectrum
contentions are conducted to decide which network gets the opportunity to operate on a
contended channel. To encourage self-coexistence among the WRAN networks, the spectrum
contention process must be fair to all participant networks. This means that the process
must be devoid of bias and cheating. Therefore, all networks participating in spectrum
contention should be able to determine the winner in a distributed manner. This eliminates
the monopoly enjoyed by DSTs in making spectrum contention decisions.
MODSC protocol is designed to support distributed spectrum contention. One of the
weaknesses of ODSC protocol is that spectrum contention is centralized and introduces
bias in the spectrum contention. In MODSC, all networks participating in the spectrum
contention take part in the spectrum contention decision process. Networks exchange their
CPNs with one another and each network uses a global spectrum contention resolution
scheme to decide the winner. The spectrum contention resolution scheme shall be discussed
later in this section. With MODSC, no one DST network is reserved the monopoly to decide
the outcome of a spectrum contention process. All contenders make decisions simultaneously
and are expected to have the same outcome.
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In ODSC protocol, the DST networks exercise monopoly in deciding the outcome of
every spectrum contentions they conduct. As a result, the spectrum contention process can
be biased towards the potential DST networks, giving them an edge to occupy the available
channels. Our proposed solution intends to prevent the type of cheating and afford every
spectrum contender equal opportunity to the available spectrum resources. First, we suggest
that each contending network, including DST networks, to exchange CPNs at the same time.
The exchange introduces transparency in the spectrum contention process, as SRC networks
are able to know the CPNs of the DST networks, which in ODSC protocol is hidden from the
SRC networks. The spectrum contenders can then apply the spectrum contention resolution
scheme to decide the winner.
However, while exchanging CPNs, a malicious BS may delay sending a CPN in order
to first read the CPN of fellow contender. Reading a contender’s CPN gives the BS an
opportunity to manipulate its CPN. To resolve this delay-induced cheating problem described
above, we apply the zero knowledge proof (ZKP) technique [85]. The ZKP technique is a
method by which parties can prove to one another that their declarations are true without
conveying any extra information apart from the declarations themselves.
To implement this technique, spectrum contenders are required to exchange irreversibly
hashed values of their CPNs before their actual CPNs are exchanged. The hashed CPNs
can prove generation time of the later-to-be-exchanged CPNs without exposing their actual
values. The hash function used for this purpose can be any irreversible hash function with
no known collisions beyond certain input size, such as SHA1 and SHA256. An additional
requirement due to the use of hash functions is the need for CPNs to be sufficiently long
to prevent dictionary attacks and minimize the rare possibility of collisions. A digest size
of 128 bits has been shown to be sufficient to protect the hash value of the CPNs from
collisions [86]. BSs should have a fixed broadcast window to exchange their hashed CPNs
with each other. Spectrum contenders exchange their actual CPNs after all hashed CPNs
CHAPTER 3. SPECTRUM CONTENTION SCHEME FOR IEEE 802.22 WRANS 66
Figure 3.4: An illustration of MODSC spectrum contention protocol.
have been received. Then validation of CPNs follows, with each contender comparing hashes
of the received CPNs with the hashed CPNs received earlier on. At the end of the comparison,
the decision function is applied to determine the winner. If the validation process fails, then
other contenders are notified and the spectrum contention is annulled by majority vote.
An illustration of MODSC message exchange is shown in Figure 3.4. MODSC scheme
starts with the broadcast of announcement message ANN by the DSTs. DSTs are required
to broadcast their current channels at the beginning of each frame. The ANN messages are
piggy-backed with the hash CPN of broadcasting DSTs. Leveraging the spectrum contention
request message REQ, SRCs declare their interest to contend with DSTs. REQ message
contains SRC identity, contended channel and hash CPN for spectrum contention. Following
the exchange of the hash CPNs, the participants exchange their actual CPNs, which is
encapsulated in MSG messages. Hashed CPNs are exchanged before actual CPNs to prevent
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CPN manipulation. Each network checks the received hash CPNs against the actual CPNs.
Using the spectrum contention resolution scheme, each network computes the winner of the
spectrum contention. Since the output is expected to be the same, the networks will know
the winner with no need for message exchange. The contended channel is then released to
the winner network.
3.5 Spectrum Contention Resolution Schemes
In ODSC, the source network is arbiter that decides the winner of a spectrum contention.
Inherent in the assignment of the responsibility to the source are the assumptions that the
source network is an honest arbiter and not biased towards any of the contending network.
The decision is reached by combining randomly generated contention priority numbers pro-
vided by the contending the networks. Assuming we have a set of networks N (j) contending
for channel j, with one of the networks as the contention source. The decision function D
used by the source network is defined as
D(x) = arg max
Ni∈N(j)
{xi} (3.1)
where x = {xi : i ∈ |N (j)|} is the set of CPNs of channel contenders. Based on the agreement
reached among the networks, the criteria for selecting the winner can be flipped such that
the network that generates the smallest CPN wins the spectrum contention. However, losers
(contention destinations) may be unsatisfied by the decision reached by the contention source
because the decision process is not transparent and is prone to manipulation.
In some case, the decision about the winner of the spectrum is conducted in a pair-wise
manner [87]. With pair-wise spectrum contention, the contention source can win with a
probability of 1/2. A contention source is declared the winner only if it wins all pair-wise
spectrum contentions. The problem with pair-wise contention is that it can lead to cascading
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spectrum contention problem addressed in [60]. Unsatisfied contenders can trigger a series of
spectrum contention instances that spreads across the network and waste spectrum resources.
3.5.1 Contention Window Manipulation
Spectrum contention resolution scheme of ODSC assume that all contending networks have
equal probability to win. This is based on the assumption that all contending networks
generate unique CPN numbers, thereby making CPN collision impossible. Even if the CPN
numbers are uniformly generated real number between 0 and 1, the possibility of a collision
cannot be completely ignored.
We proceed to show that the probability of winning to both source and destination
networks is not exactly 1/2, especially in a case where CPN is an integer. Actually, the chance
of winning is dependent, among other factors, on the contention window W ∈ Z+, which
specifies the range of CPN numbers generated by a network’s pseudo-random generator.
We assume that all networks generate CPN number from the range [1,W ]. We show that
it is possible to manipulate the outcome of a spectrum contention by simply shrinking or
extending W . This implies manipulation of the pseudo-random generator to produce winning
CPNs.
We consider a case where there are two overlapping WRAN networks Ni and Nk in
involved in a pairwise spectrum contention. N
(j)
i denotes that network Ni is contending
channel j. Suppose we denote the windows used by both networks as Wi and Wk and
random CPN variables as ri ∈ [1,Wi] and rk ∈ [1,Wk]. Assuming Nk can select CPN
w ∈ [1,Wk], then the chances of Ni winning the contention will depend on whether it is able
to generate CPN within the range [w + 1,Wi]. This is the joint probability of Nj picking
CPN rk and Ni picking ri from [rk + 1,Wi]. Thus, probability that ri greater than rk is













Wi − w (3.2)
where Si>j denotes the event that Ni wins the spectrum contention over Nj. We expect that
when Wi = Wk, then Pr(Si>k) = Pr(Sk>i). Hence,
Pr(Si>k) = Pr(Sk>i) =
W − 1
2W
where W = Wi = Wk (3.3)
Considering that the spectrum contention might end up in a tie, we have Pr(Si>k) +
Pr(Sk>i) + Pr(Si=k) = 1, where Si=k denotes an event where there is a tie. Solving for





The significance of this result is that the probability of having tie is non-zero and very much
dependent on the value W , which is likely to be fixed for all contending networks. However,
it is a serious assumption to make, considering the possibility that contenders might use
different window sizes. Alteration of the window sizes introduces bias whether Wi > Wk or
Wi < Wk. So in a case where Wi 6= Wk, we have




Pr(Sk>i) = 1− Wi + 1
2Wk
(3.6)
It is not hard to observe that when Wi > Wj then Ni has undue advantage over Nk
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(3.9)
The second component on the R.H.S. of equation 3.9 reduces to zero, since Nk cannot





It is easy to show that Pr(Si>k) > Pr(Sk>i), which implies that the spectrum con-
tention resolution is biased towards Ni. Suppose Ni has zero probability of winning, that is,
Pr(Si>k) = 0. This implies that Wi = (Wk+1)/2 (see equation 3.5), which is a contradiction
since we started off with the assumption that Wi > Wk. So Ni has a none zero probability
of winning the contention. Likewise, if we suppose that Pr(Sk>i) = 0, then we have Wk = 1.
Plugging this into equation 3.5, we have Pr(Si>k) = (Wi − 1)/Wi. This means that the
best outcome of spectrum contention between Nk and Ni is a tie, which happens with a
probability equivalent to 1/Wi. Fairness can be acheived only when Pr(Si>k) = Pr(Sk>i).
Solving equality, we have,





2Wi −Wk − 1 = Wk − 1
Wi = Wk
(3.11)
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This represents the condition that must be satisfied for a spectrum contention to be declared
fair. The significance of the bias that exists when Wi > Wk can be seen by simply plugging
in real numerical values. For instance, when Wi = Wk + 1 and Wk = 256, Pr(Si>k) = 0.5
and Pr(Sk>i) = 0.496.
Consequently, a contending network with the largest Wmax has an undue advantage of
winning over others when the decision function D is defined as in equation 3.1. The reverse
is the case when the contention resolution rule is such that the network with the smallest
CPN wins. In such a case, a contending network with Wmin will win most of the time.
3.5.2 MODSC Spectrum Contention Resolution Schemes
We suggest two spectrum contention resolution schemes for pairwise and n-wise spectrum
contention. With these resolution schemes, all participating networks unanimously reach a
decision on the winner of a spectrum contention. There are no criteria involved (min or
max) and all participants arrive at the same conclusion using a common decision function
in a distributed manner.
Pairwise Spectrum Contention Resolution
Pairwise spectrum contention entails that only two BSs are involved in the contention process.
The process initiated by a contention source interested in an advertised channel. Suppose
two BSs Ni and Nk generated and exchanged CPNs x and y respectively. The decision
function D(x, y) for the spectrum contention resolution is given as
D(x, y) = F (x, y)⊕G(x, y) (3.12)
where ⊕ is an XOR logical operator. The function F (x, y) ∈ {0, 1} is defined as F (x, y) =
(x + y) mod 2 and G(x, y) ∈ {0, 1} is defined such that G(x, y) = 0 when x < y, and
G(x, y) = 1 when x > y. In a case where x = y, the spectrum contention is repeated.
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The function G(x, y) introduces uncertainty in D(x, y) by taking into consideration the
relative values of x and y. The computation of D(x, y) is carried out independently by the
BSs and the outputs expected to be the same, provided CPNs are not manipulated. We
assume that prior to the spectrum contention, contenders have agreed to a injective function
f : Ni → {0, 1} that uniquely maps each contender to an element in {0, 1}. By this means,
each participant will know who won the contention after computing D(x, y).
N-wise Spectrum Contention Resolution
Given a scenario where spectrum contention can involve more than two BSs, the decision
function derived for pairwise spectrum contention resolution cannot be used. If the pairwise
spectrum contention resolution is used, at least O(log n) spectrum contentions would be
required to decide the winner, with n being the number of contending BSs. The decision
function for n contenders will be a function with n input parameters denoted as x = {xi |
xi ∈ Z+}ni=1. We define the function as







D(x) ∈ {i}n−1i=0 is inherently uniformly distributed assuming that the randomly generated
CPN values were also uniformly generated, that is, D(x) ∼ U(0, n− 1). The earlier decision
function cannot be applied because F (x)⊕G(x)  U(0, n− 1) ∀xi ∈ Z+. With the help of
the decision function D(x) and a predefined mapping function f : i→ Ni, each participant
has an equal chance to emerge as the winner of a spectrum contention. The simultaneous and
independent computation of D(x) to reach a unanimous decision in a distributed manner
rids the malicious DSTs of the capability of altering spectrum contention outcomes.
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3.5.3 Non-Cheatability and Collision-Proof of MODSC
The design of MODSC emphasizes non-cheatability in terms of CPN manipulation. Spec-
trum contention processes should also be collusion-proof. This means that no group of
WRAN networks can collude to alter the outcome of spectrum contention in their favor.
Suppose that spectrum contention is a game and each network selects a CPN independently
of the other networks. We can consider the choice of a particular CPN xj as a pure strat-
egy such that xj ∈ [xmin, xmax] is a pure strategy. Using a random CPN generator with a
probability mass function Pr(x), a mixed strategy of these pure strategies can be derived.
Regardless of strategies (pure or mixed) implemented by the players (BSs), no player should
have an advantage over another in winning the spectrum contention game. The spectrum
contention should present to every player with equal opportunity to win, provided the CPNs
are not tampered with. Therefore the decision function must meet the non-cheatability and
collusion-proof criteria to be considered applicable in deciding winners of spectrum con-
tentions.
Definition 2. A non-cheatable decision function D(x) need to satisfy the following condition:
Each player has a strategy s0 that guarantees at least
1
n
to win regardless of other players’
strategies i.e. Pr(D(x) = k) > 1
n
when xk ∼ s0.
Definition 3. A collusion-proof decision function D(x) need to satisfy the following con-
dition: For a colluding set of players, C ⊂ {N1 . . . Nn}, regardless of the collusion scheme
Pr({xk∈C}), Pr(D(x) ∈ C) ≤ |C|n .
Proposition 3.5.1. Any non-cheatable decision function is collusion-proof, and vice versa.
Proposition 3.5.1 is quite obvious. Since D({xk}k∈0···n−1) is non cheatable, all players not
belonging to the colluding set C use strategy s0, such that Pr(D({xk} /∈ C)) ≥ n−|C|n . This
also impies that Pr(D({xk} ∈ C)) ≤ 1− n−|C|n = |C|n
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The non-cheatability condition assures that regardless of the strategy employed by play-
ers, the probability of winning remains the same for all. Collusion-proof condition ensures
that collusion among players cannot increase their chances of winning the game. This condi-
tion is obviously necessary for every individual player. Thus, for every individual player Ni,
there exists a strategy s0 such that if all other players are to collude, s0 still guarantees a
fair winning probability 1
n
to the individual players. That is, Pr(D(x) = Ni) > 1n if xi ∼ s0.
We proceed to give the proof of non-cheatability and collusion-proofness of the decision
function stated in equation 3.13. We recall that the domain for the set of CPNs {xk} is all
integers from 0 to W − 1, where r  W .
Proof. Suppose we have a certain player Ni, i ∈ 1 · · ·n. If player Ni uses the strategy
Pr(xi = a|a ∈ 0 · · ·W − 1) = 1
W




xk) mod n = i)
Suppose other players adopted a joint strategy such that Pr({xk}k∈1···n\{i}) with a certain
probability mass function py(y) such that y =
∑
k∈1···n\{i} xk. Obviously, y ∈ 0 · · · (n−1)(W−
1)−1 and ∑(n−1)(W−1)−1y=0 = 1 (fairness within collusion). Therefore, for a specific y0 we have
that
Pr((y0 + xi) mod n = i) = Pr(xi mod n = (i− y0 mod n) mod n)
We know that the xi is uniformly distributed within the range [0, · · · ,W−1] and W  n.
Then ∀m ∈ 0 · · ·n − 1, Pr(xi mod n = m) ≈ 1n . So the probability of player Ni to win,
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given that y is distributed according to py(y), becomes
Pr((y + xi) mod n = i) =
(n−1)(r−1)−1∑
y=1












We can represent the WRAN networks as a conflict graph G(N,E) defined by a set of
nodes (networks) N = {Ni} and a set of conflict edges E = {(i, k) : i 6= k&Ni, Nk ∈ N}.
Two networks cannot simultaneously operate on the same channel without interference if
there is an edge between them. To decide who operates on a contended channel, neighbors
participate in spectrum contention.
Consider a complete conflict graph G(N,E) with a set of variable neighbor degrees {di}
with a single channel j available for all networks. Isolated spectrum contention can cause
cascading spectrum contention problem, which leads to wastage of spectrum resources. As
an alternative, we suggest a spectrum contention, involving all interested networks. At the
end of the spectrum contention, one winner emerges that can operate without interference.
However, some networks that do not share an edge with the winner network are deprived
of spectrum opportunity. By conducting another spectrum contention, at least one network
might benefit from the shared channel.
Suppose the winner of a spectrum contention on channel j is network Nk. We denote
the set of networks that are qualified to participate again in spectrum contention as N c. We
express N c as
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N c = N \Nk ∪ {Ni : (i, k) ∈ E}
Provided that N c 6= ∅, repeated spectrum contention leads to channel reuse, which
enhances spectrum utilization.
Although repeated spectrum contention enhances spectrum utilization, not every network
receives fair share of the spectrum opportunity. The high neighbor degree reduces the chances
of a network winning the spectrum contention. Assuming in the t-th round, Ni participates
in a spectrum contention involving nt contending networks. We define the event that Ni
wins as Sti . Obviously, the probability Pr(S
t
i ) wins in the current round t is 1/nt, provided
that the spectrum contention was fair.
However, Ni might not win in round t but have a chance to win in subsequent rounds.
It is important to know that the chances of Ni winning in the next round of spectrum is
dependent on its position in the conflict. If Ni shares a link with the last winner, then
Ni automatically excluded from the next contest. This implies that the probability of Ni
winning in the next round is the joint probability of Ni losing in current round, not sharing
an edge with the winner and being the winner of the next round of spectrum contention.
Thus, the probability Pr(St+1i ) that Ni wins the next round of spectrum contention, with a












nt − di,t − 1 (3.14)
where nt+1 = nt − di,t − 1.
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3.6 Numerical Results
In this section, we present a numerical analysis and performance evaluation of ODSC and
MODSC spectrum contention schemes. The network topologies shown in Figure 3.5 are
used in our analysis. We assume that there is a single channel for the entire system of
WRAN networks. We adopt the Beacon Period Framing (BPF) protocol that guarantees
reliable, efficient and scalable internetwork communication [26]. Jain’s fairness index is used
in quantifying the degree of fairness in the system. System utility is measured in terms of
the number of superframes used by networks without any interference.
(a) Wheel (b) Cycle (c) Complete
Figure 3.5: Network topologies used in simulating ODSC and MODSC spectrum contention
scenarios.
Depending on network topology, an additional spectrum contention can be conducted
before the end of a superframe. This leads to reallocation of the same channel to another
non-interfering WRAN network, which we refer to as channel reuse. Channel reuse is possi-
ble if there is at least a single WRAN network, whose operations on the contended channel
will not interfere with the operations of the winner network from the previous contention(s).
It is important to note that since the winner of a spectrum contention is decided simul-
taneously, losers will know instantly whether to initiate another spectrum contention for a
possible channel reuse. The knowledge of network topology also helps losers to ascertain con-
flicting scenarios and avoid initiating spectrum contention. We denote channel reuse as the
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parameter r, which represents the number of spectrum contentions that can be conducted
or allocations that can be made for the same channel. For instance, r = 3 indicates that it
is possible to conduct 3 spectrum contentions in a superframe.
3.6.1 Fairness in ODSC System
Simulation results show that fairness in a system of WRAN networks implementing the
ODSC protocol depends on network topology. We use the well-known Jain’s Fairness Index
(JFI) to measure fairness in the system. Given that the ODSC scheme is highly vulnerable,
we simulated the impact the presence of malicious contenders will have on fairness in the
system. We assume that the malicious contenders can make transitions between two states:
active and inactive states. We note that an active malicious DST always declares itself the
winner of any spectrum contention process. On the other hand, an inactive malicious DST
follows the specified guidelines of the protocol in determining the winner of any spectrum
contention process. For experimental purposes, we assume a malicious DST makes a transi-
tion from inactive state to active state with a probability p and makes a reverse transition
with a probability 1 − p. Simulation results are presented in Figure 3.6. The results show
how fairness in the system varies with p for the select network topologies.
In this experiment, we set the number of WRAN networks n = 20. Also a malicious con-
tender is selected randomly at the beginning of the simulation, invariant to the contender’s
position in the network topology. We observed that with low malicious transition probabil-
ities, the ODSC protocol achieves near-optimal fairness. As we know the network topology
reflects the coexistence constraints existing in the system. This explains the difference in
fairness under the different network topologies. In a complete network topology, all partic-
ipants are aware that only one network can operate at any time, despite the possibility of
cheating occurring in the system. When p is high, we have a scenario where one network
can highjack the contended channel and refuse to release it. Fairness in wheel and cycle
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Figure 3.6: Variation of fairness with malicious transition probability.
network topologies are purely affected by the fact that more than one network can win the
right to operate on the channel. This creates the possibility of adjacent winners of spectrum
contention that could interfere and lay wastage of the spectrum opportunity. The winners
are thus denied of their fair share of the spectrum opportunities that might arise. In general,
scenarios with high p and either cycle or wheel network topology are far better and more
stable in terms of fairness than scenarios with complete network topology.
3.6.2 MODSC Performance in Different Network Topologies
Performance of the MODSC system under the three selected network topologies using the
average system utility metric is illustrated in Figure 3.7. Average system utility is best in a
system with cycle network topology, where each WRAN network has at most two neighbor
WRAN networks. In a complete network topology, even though spectrum opportunity is
stable, we observe a steady decline in average system utility with increasing number of net-
works. The results obtained emphasize the importance of placement of the WRAN networks
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in the expected system performance. To maximize system performance, WRAN networks
have to be setup at locations where they have minimal number of neighbors. In cases where
this requirement cannot be met, especially in a complete network topology scenario, MODSC
ensures that self-coexistence among networks is maintained. The in-built features of the pro-
tocols mitigate against CPN manipulation and eliminate the possibility of cheating during
spectrum contentions.
3.6.3 Performance Comparison of ODSC and MODSC
ODSC protocol stipulates that SRCs send spectrum contention requests on demand to con-
tention destination DSTs. With this approach, SRCs need at least one DST to commence
any spectrum contention process. Even if by chance, one or more SRCs discover that their
operations on the contended channel will not interfere with the winner of the just concluded
spectrum contention, no spectrum contention can be conducted until the next superframe
when the winner DST sends out an ODSC ANN message. This leads to the wastage of the


























Figure 3.7: Average system utility derived in MODSC system.
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spectrum opportunity, which one of the SRCs could have benefited from. Furthermore, the
fact that SRCs have to randomly or systematically select a DST to contend with creates
a self-coexistence problem. Consider a WRAN network with a wheel network topology de-
picted in Figure 3.8. Before spectrum contention, there is a set of DSTs {C,E}. During the
contention process, the SRCs {A,B, F,D} have to select independently one DST to contend
with. Suppose those that decided to contend C are YC = {A,F} and those that decided
to contend with E are YE = {D,B}. If after the spectrum contention, F and D emerge
as winners of their respective contention processes, then both BSs cannot operate without
interfering with one another. According to the provisions of ODSC no spectrum contention
takes place until the next superframe. As a result of this restriction, the entire spectrum
opportunity is wasted.
Figure 3.8: An illustration of a typical ODSC spectrum contention scenario.
However, with MODSC, the procedure is quite different. When a BS initiates spectrum
contention request for a specific channel, all interested BSs will participate in the process.
Their participation allows them to know the winner of the spectrum contention simultane-
ously. Then, with the help of this information and the network topology, the BSs will know
exactly whether to initiate another spectrum contention before superframe ends. The BP
frame size and the number of BPs in a superframe limit channel reuse, which is the same
as the number of spectrum contentions that can be conducted in a given superframe. Using
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illustration in Figure 3.9 as an example, we see that in the worst case, r = 1 and exactly
one BS emerges a winner at the end of the first round of contention. Let us assume that the
winner BS is B. None of B’s neighbors {A,F,E} can initiate another spectrum contention.
The remaining BSs {C,D}, with the knowledge about the network topology and winner
BS, can conduct another spectrum contention. The operation of the winner of this later
spectrum contention will not interfere with B’s. The fact that MODSC supports channel
reuse improves the efficiency of spectrum utilization and reduces spectrum starvation.
Figure 3.9: MODSC Spectrum contention scenario
Consider a system of WRAN networks with n = 5 and r = 2 for T superframes. In
system with cycle network topology, each BS has equal opportunity to win either first or
second round of spectrum contention. Thus, the expected system utility E[U ] ≤ 2T . In
a system with a wheel network topology, the scenario is different. When the central BS,
denoted as Nm, wins the expected payoff is T . However, when any other BS Ni 6= Nm wins
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the spectrum contention the expected payoff is 2T . Therefore, expected utility E[U ] in this
scenario is E[U ] = (2n−1)T
n
. Substituting n = 5 in the equation and computing expected
channel reuse using the expression E[r] = E[U ]/T , we find that E[r] < r, which is confirmed
by simulation results illustrated in Figure 3.11. Comparison of the performances of ODSC
and MODSC based on channel reuse under wheel and cycle network topologies are shown in
Figures 3.11 and 3.10 respectively.
Figure 3.10: Performance comparison of ODSC and MODSC in cycle network topology.
We can clearly see that MODSC, in contrast with ODSC, guarantees more channel reuse
with increasing number of WRAN networks in both cycle and wheel network topologies.
Contrary to this trend, the ODSC system shows a continuous decline in channel reuse as the
number of networks increase. This trend observed in ODSC system can be explained by the
independent spectrum contentions conducted, which may end up in winners conflicting on
the same channel. Comparing the trends in Figures 3.11 and 3.10, we can say that channel
reuse is better in cycle network topology than in wheel network topology. This is also
anticipated because the central WRAN network, in system with a wheel network topology,
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Figure 3.11: Performance comparison of ODSC and MODSC in wheel network topology.
plays a significant role in determining the channel reuse.
In complete network topology, channel reuse is bound to r = 1. Considering interference
constraints, only one spectrum contention can be conducted in a superframe and only one
network can emerge as the winner of the process. Therefore, in a complete network topology,
channel reuse is constant even with increasing number of WRAN networks, and regardless
of the type spectrum contention protocol implemented in the system.
3.7 Conclusion
In this work, we address some of the vulnerabilities of ODSC protocol and proposed a mod-
ified version of the protocol that addresses the security vulnerabilities. We have shown that
by shrinking or expanding the contention window, one contender may have undue advantage
over others during spectrum contention depending the criteria for deciding the winner. The
ODSC also grants the DST network the laxity to manipulate spectrum contention outcome
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to its favor. By modeling the behavior of a malicious DST network as dependent on the
frequency of transitions between honest and malicious state, we are able to show how fair-
ness in spectrum contention is impacted. ODSC lacks the mechanism to verifying DST’s
decision and as a result fairness is guaranteed. On the other hand, MODSC is a protocol
that guarantees fairness by eliminating the possibility of cheating by malicious spectrum
contenders. The protocol also gives better system performance with the implementation of
n-wise spectrum contention, which can increase channel reuse.
Chapter 4
Enabling Self-Coexistence through
Risk Motivated Deference Structure
Formation
4.1 Introduction
Coalition formation in cognitive radio networks is sometimes approached as a covert attempt
by a group of networks trying to exploit spectrum resources in a way that is disadvantageous
to other networks in the system. Tan’s work on the effect of parochialism in cognitive
radio networks [88] deemed the formation of parochial community as malicious because such
coalition can deviate from the Nash equilibrium (N.E.) switching probability to benefit more
than others. On one hand, such change in strategy does not promote self-coexistence in
the system. Tan et al. argued that the existence of parochial community favors only the
members of the community known as the insiders more than non-members known as the
outsiders. As a result, the system changes from a state of equilibrium to an unstable state.
On the contrary, a deviation from N.E. strategy could mean the search a better strategy
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that benefits the coalition, which is not necessarily malicious. More so, the formation of
coalitions or communities to access spectrum resources could be initiated by different factors
other than the greedy predisposition or parochialism. In the midst of intense competition
for spectrum opportunity, it is actually difficult for networks to agree to a fixed switching
strategy, expressed in terms of switching probability. Naturally, an alternative option to
reduce spectrum contention and improve spectrum utilization is by forming coalition, where
networks defer transmission to one another. Such cooperation to defer transmission to
another network leads to coordinated access that enhances self-coexistence in the spectrum
environment. We refer to such coalitions as deference structure. A more formal definition is
given below:
Definition 4. A deference structure (DS) is a coalition formed by the CR networks to have
coordinated access to a specific channel or spectrum band of interest. The selected channel
of interest is referred to as DS channel.
Although deference structures are formed per channel or spectrum, it is possible to have
multiple deference structure formed independently to access the same channel. With limited
supply of spectrum resources limited, it is impossible for the system to attain an absorbing
state (convergence). Formation of deference structures offers an opportunity for networks
to collaboratively access available resources, which can increase the efficiency of spectrum
sharing. The formation of such network structures is guided by network’s perception of
risk of spectrum contention and interest to mitigate loss of transmission opportunities to
spectrum competition. Therefore, the motivating factor for all participant networks is to
reduce spectrum contention risk rather than promote parochialism.
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4.2 Deference Structure Model
Consider a system consisting of n CR networks constrained to operate over a fixed number m
of spectrum band (channels). All the CR networks are stationary and able to communicate
over a common control channel. Since the focus is on coalition formation, we assume that the
primary users (PU) are rarely present. Two or more CR networks conflict if they attempt to
transmit over the same channel. The set of all CR network is denoted asN = {Ni : i ∈ [1, n]}.
The system’s initial mode is non-cooperative.
In order to minimize the risk of spectrum contention, CR networks merge to form DS
coalition. Each coalition formed S ⊆ N choose a preferred channel Cj that all members will
collaboratively access without conflicts. With each coalition, networks can defer transmission
to a later time for other members to transmit urgent information. The initiator of the DS
formation process is automatically assigned the role of DS coalition head. The DS coalition
head is responsible for coordination of all activities, including transmission deference, within
the coalition.
With high levels of spectrum contentions, CR networks are triggered to broadcast DS
requests neighboring networks to engage in coalition formation for improved spectrum access.
Some networks might be truly altruistic in nature and willing to form a DS coalition for
general performance improvement across the system [89]. It is possible also to have a category
of networks that are willing to participate in coalition formation only because of the benefit
they will derive from the collaborative process. The remaining group of networks maybe
opposed to any collaborative effort to mitigate spectrum contention. These networks are
optimistic that they will find contention-free channels for their operations. A CR network
that joins a DS coalition is referred to as an insider network. Other networks that refuse to
join a deference structure are referred to as outsider networks.
DS coalition formation could be preceded by negotiation between networks on the allo-
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Figure 4.1: This diagram illustrate deference structure coalition formation model. The
dashed colored lines identifies the different DS coalitions that exist between secondary users
in the system.
cation of transmission time slots and the order in which deference channels are accessed.
Insider networks, within the same DS coalition, do not contend with each other. However,
the insider networks, of the same DS coalition, may contend with outsider networks for
spectrum access, especially on non-deference channels.
DS coalition formation is initiated by a CR network that has assessed the level of spectrum
contention risk on a preferred channel to be above acceptable threshold. Other networks,
contending for control of the channel, also assess the risk before responding to requests
to form a deference structure. Given this type of scenario, networks participating in the
deference structure formation anticipate a reduction in risk and an improvement in average
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system utility.
4.2.1 Implementation of Deference Structure
The implementation of deference structure is a measure taken to mitigate the wastage of
spectrum opportunities that are available in the absence of the licensed band owners. Spec-
trum resources are limited and scarce. To survive the crunch on the available spectrum
resources, effort must be made within the CR system to implement measures that enable ef-
fective and efficient spectrum utilization. CR networks, equipped with their cognitive ability
should be able to initiate and sustain coordinated access to vacant licensed bands.
A CR network that urgently needs to improve its utility by reducing risk of contention
initiates deference structure formation. The initiator of the process broadcasts a request
message, announcing its interest to form a deference structure for access to a channel of
interest. It is possible that more than one network could make the announcement, given
that each network in the system may have different level of tolerance threshold for spectrum
contention risk. Such a scenario can bottleneck coalition formation because of multiple
initiators. Bottlenecks can be resolved by networks choosing to respond to request with
earliest timestamp or from a network with the least identifier.
As we have already mentioned earlier, response to a request may depend on the related-
ness of the CR networks, urgency to operate in a contention-free spectrum band or altruistic
predisposition of CR networks. In the current implementation of deference structure, re-
sponse is motivated by the desire to minimize contention risk. Networks use a risk-motivated
channel selection scheme (RCSS) to evaluate the risk of contending in the advertised channel
with respect to other available channels in the spectrum. Networks respond if the risk is well
above a tolerable level. The RCSS scheme will be discussed later.
Upon forming a deference structure, networks reach an agreement on how to opportunis-
tically access the deference channel. The channel is time-sliced to accommodate all members
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of the coalition. Networks are prohibited from forming a deference structure on the same
deference channel with outsiders. Coordinated access to the deference channel is enforced
by means of shared spectrum access list, specifying the order in which the networks access
the channel. Besides the goal of minimizing contention risk, the sharing of spectrum re-
sources among CR networks in a deference structure community must be fair. A way of
ensuring fairness in the coalition would be to assign each participating member network
equal transmission time slots. In the case, where a member needs to transmit time-sensitive
information, other members can defer their transmission operation to a later time.
4.2.2 Deference Structure Protocol
The formation and coordination of a deference structures rely on message exchanges among
the CR networks. Specifically MAC messaging is of paramount importance for these coali-
tions to exist. Deference structure protocol is built on top of 802.11 MAC protocol and
inherits most of its features including contention-handling mechanism needed to mitigate
congestion.
Communication in our DS model is conducted via a common control channel (CCC)
during a beacon period (BP). We consider BP as a period in the super frame when networks
communicate and coordinate activities within their respective DS coalitions. In contrast
with the beacon periods implemented in [90] [91] [92], BP in deference structure model can
be of variable of length and can extend to overlap with the data transmission period. The
deference structure formation process continues until a final agreement is reached among the
participating networks. This helps to avoid scalability issues associated with fixed BP and
allows communication to continue by using part of the transmission slot time.
At the beginning of the deference structure formation, an initiator broadcasts a request
(REQ) message to all CR networks, advertising the channel that it desires to form a defer-
ence structure on (see Figure 4.3). The REQ message contains, among other information,
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Figure 4.2: A finite state diagram illustrating the deference structure coalition formation
process.
the identifier of the initiator network, the advertised channel identifier (frequency), and
the priorities (high data rate, long range transmission etc.). REQ messages also contain
request expiration time, also known as Time To Live (TTL). When TTL expires no subse-
quent responses are ignored. Interested CR networks respond by sending to the initiator a
response (RSP) message, which contains the responding network’s identifier as well as its
spectrum requirements (desired duration to use the channel, time-sensitive data transmis-
sion needs etc.). The initiator, upon receiving the RSPs from interested networks, schedules
the networks according to their various requirements in a manner that ensures fairness to
all participating networks. In some cases, scheduling might be accompanied by negotiation
between the networks on the fraction of time slots or frames assigned to them. This will
require the initiator to issue a negotiation message (NEG), to which a potential member can
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either respond to or ignore completely. The criteria for terminating the DS formation at
this stage ranges from partial responses to complete refusal to ACK the NEG message by
the participating CR networks. The refusal comes as a result of the networks refusing the
imputation offered to them. The initiator later multicasts the deference structure message
(DSM) to member networks. DSM contains the deference order, which specifies the order
in which networks access the deference channel. The order is expressed using a prioritized
list which members adhere to assuming they are all honest networks. Multicast of DSM is
followed by an acknowledgment (ACK) from the recipients, which marks the completion of
the DS formation cycle.
4.3 Estimating Utility in Deference Structure Model
In a typical DSA scenario, CR networks are devoid of the knowledge of the particular channel
that their neighbors are going to access. With a limited supply of spectrum resources, there
is a potential risk of networks contending one or more channels in attempt to carry out
transmission. In chapter 2 we derived an expression that describes the potential of spectrum
contention on a given channel. The probability of spectrum contention Pr{Dmn } on a given
channel j, supposing that there are n CR networks contending for m channels, was defined
as
Pr{Dmn } ≥ 1− e
−n(n−1)
2m (4.1)
To emphasize the significance of the spectrum contention experienced on channel j, we
rewrite Pr{Dmn } as p(n,m)j . The tuple (n,m) is another way of representing system configu-
ration. Based on the results obtained in the previous chapter, we know that the probability
of spectrum contention can increase either with an increase in n or a decrease in m.
Suppose that network Ni in the system is capable of deriving a utility of u(Cj) by oper-
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Figure 4.3: Deference structure coalition formation process.
ating on channel j with zero interference. We assume that the channels have equal spectrum
capacity as specified earlier in the system model. Thus, the utility u(Cj) per channel is
uniform and proportional to the number of bits W that can be delivered to a potential desti-
nation during a synchronized transmission slot of length τ seconds. Gupta and Kurmar [93],
through their extensive work on capacity of wireless networks, established that the through-
put capacity of a random ad-hoc networks is equivalent to Θ(W/
√
n log n) bits per second.
We can choose to define u(Cj) in terms of number of bits transfered during a transmission
slot τ ,
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u(Cj) = W · τ/
√
n log n (4.2)
This model suggests that utility derived from channel diminishes as the number of net-
works operating on that channel increases. This goes with the assumption that there is zero
interference during the transmission period of τ slots. Contending for spectrum opportunity
does lead to interference which impacts on the utility derived. As a result of interference,
affected networks incur a loss or interference cost ν(Cj) that is measurable in terms of the
utility u(Cj). Since there could be partial loss of transmittable bits, ν(Cj) is defined as
ν(Cj) = −u(Cj) · αt 0 ≤ αt ≤ 1 (4.3)
where αt is the fraction of the utility (transmittable bits) that was lost due to interference
resulting from spectrum contention and nearby transmission activities. We assume αt is
only time dependent. However, αt could be dependent on other external factors such as
the nearby transmission activities as well as on the number of contending networks and
their proximity to each other. The channel degradation worsens with increasing number of
networks generating the interference. Therefore, we cannot attribute interference only to
channel contenders. The activities of nearby primary users do significantly contribute to the
degradation of channel quality. As a result of degradation in channel quality, the amount
of utility derived by operating networks will reduce significantly. Since we do not know
the exact distribution of these external factors and the mapping of networks’ transmission
attempts to the set of available channels, we simply denote αt as a function of time t.
Therefore, the utility derived by operating on a channel that is susceptible to such channel
disturbances is given as
ut(Cj) = u(Cj) + ν(Cj) = u(Cj) · (1− αt) (4.4)
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Since ut(Cj) is the utility derived by a lone network operating on channel j at time slot
t, the cumulative utility derived over T transmission slots can be expressed as
U(Cj) =
∫
ut(Cj) · δt = u(Cj)
∫
(1− αt) · δt (4.5)
The cumulative utility U(Cj) is an estimate of the total utility derived with zero in-
terference. In fact, it is more comprehensive to consider the impact of expected spectrum
contention on the utility derived from channel j. By taking this into consideration, we can
derive the expected utility with the assumption that the probability of spectrum contention
involving n networks is equivalent to p
(n,m)
j ∈ [0, 1]. We concisely represent p(n,m)j as pj.








[1− pj · (1 + αt)]
(4.6)











The expression above depicts expected utility by considering cases where channel j is
either completely devoid of spectrum contention or is severely contended by two or more
networks. Even though equation 4.6 is a statement about estimated utility, bot parameters pj
and αt are unknowns and remains to be estimated by the networks based on prior experience.
Based on the conjecture in chapter 2 about estimating pj, we expect E[U(Cj)] to diminish
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with the formation of a DS coalition. Assuming k ∈ [1, n] is the size of an arbitrary DS coali-
tion, the number of contenders decreases such that the system k less spectrum contenders.
This implies n→ n− k+ 1 and less conflict for the DS coalition. Members of the DS would
anticipate spectrum contention from the subset of non-member networks that may want to
access the same channel with them. To show that this event leads to a reduction in con-
tention, we compare the probability of spectrum contention on channel j before and after the
deference structure formation. Before the formation, there are n networks that are possible
contenders of channel j with the probability denoted as pbj = p
(n)
j . After the formation of
the deference structure of k networks, then there are n− k + 1 contenders with probability
of contention denoted as paj = p
(n−k+1)
j . Based on previous analysis in chapter 2, we know
that inf{paj} < inf{pbj} since n > n− k+ 1 with k 6= 0. Suppose that E[U(Cj)] ∼ E[Uaj ] then
E[Uaj ] = u(Cj)T − paju(Cj) ·
∑
t∈T
(1 + αt) (I)
E[U bj ] = u(Cj)T − pbju(Cj) ·
∑
t∈T
(1 + αt) (II)
(4.7)
Here, we assume that both strategies are implemented for T transmission slots. Sub-
tracting (II) from (I), we have
E[Uaj ]− E[U bj ] = (pbj − paj ) · u(Cj)
∑
t∈T
(1 + αt) (4.8)
where ∆p = pbj − paj is change in the probability of spectrum contention with reduction
in the number of contending networks. In other words, ∆p ≥ 0 captures the reduction in
the susceptibility of a channel to spectrum contention, given the decrease in the number of
possible contenders. Actually ∆p is equivalent
CHAPTER 4. RISK-MOTIVATED DEFERENCE STRUCTURE FORMATION 98
∆p = e−(n−k+1)(n−k)/2m − e−n(n−1)/2m (4.9)
With no change in pj then ∆p = 0. Assuming k = γn, where γ is the fraction of
n networks that are forming DS coalition. It is interesting to observe that the condition
∆p = 0 holds only when γ = 1/n or γ = 2 with m 6= 0. However, the later is unrealistic
since k ≤ n. If αt is insignificant that is αt → 0 then
E[Uaj ]− E[U bj ] = ∆p · u(Cj)T (4.10)
Depending on the number of networks that merge to form a DS coalition, the increase in
expected utility of that coalition is quite significant. In the face of severe spectrum scarcity,
especially in a case where n > m, pbj is much closer to 1. The formation of the coalition
leads to pbj → paj . It is interesting to observe that as pb −∆p → 0, E[Uaj ] → u(Cj)T , which
signifies an improvement in expected utility over time T .
By joining a DS coalition, each of the k network in the coalition is expected to receive a fair
share of the spectrum opportunity on the deference channel. Fair share of the transmission
frame could mean either an equal transmission slots or enough transmission slots to meet
channel requirement. Assuming each member receives equal number of transmission slots,
then we expect that the average utility is equivalent to U¯j = U
a
j /k. From the perspective
of self-coexistence, this is far more beneficial to the networks than the risk of spectrum
contention they face operating as singletons.
4.4 Spectrum Contention Risk Assessment
Estimating the risk of spectrum contention is important for networks to reach a decision to
participate in deference structure formation. Continued spectrum contention poses signifi-
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cant risk to conduct interference-free transmission. Here, we present a way for networks to
estimate the risk of spectrum contention.
4.4.1 Spectrum Contention Risk
Risk is the possibility of experiencing loss or the possible cost of experiencing a loss. In
economics, risk is measured as the standard deviation of historical performance or the average
performance of an investment. A large deviation from a normal or expected trend would
normally serve as an indicator of high risk associated with the observed process. Similarly,
in the context of spectrum access, the record of the frequency of spectrum contentions
can be used as an indicator of the level of risk associated in transmitting over a select
channel. Consequently, the risk of selecting a contended channel is heightened by the absence
of secondary-to-secondary etiquette, common in decentralized network settings. High risk
introduces the anticipation of low throughput and huge losses due to re-transmissions and
channel switching costs. Therefore, it is important for networks to measure the risk they face
and incorporate it in decision-making regarding coalition formation. Huge losses incurred as
a result of repeated failure to transmit can be avoided and at least, a fraction of the expected
spectrum utility can be beneficial to the network.
When a network selects a channel to operate on, it expects to receive a certain amount
of utility, provided no interference occurs within the transmission frame. For simplicity, we
denote this expected utility as b¯ which represents the fraction of transmission frame with
zero interference. Hence, b¯ can be treated as a real number in the interval [0, 1]. We denote
the actual utility derived at the end of the transmission frame as b. Assuming no utility is
derived if there is slight interference, then b and b¯ can be treated as binary variables such
that b, b¯ ∈ {0, 1}.
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4.4.2 Risk as Expected Loss
We define spectrum contention risk as an expected loss due to failed transmission. We
proceed to derive an expression for this risk measure in terms of the loss incurred as a result
of failed transmission caused by spectrum contention. The loss incurred by a network over
a select channel at time t is measured by L(bt, b¯t), where L is the loss function with range
[0,∞). We adopt the absolute loss function Labs, such that L = Labs. Therefore, loss of
spectrum opportunity in time slot t is defined as
L(bt, b¯t) = |bt − b¯t| (4.11)
By virtue of selecting a channel, a network anticipates to derive b¯ from the channel.
Therefore, the loss function associated with such a selection can be expressed as
Lb¯ = L(b, b¯) (4.12)
Since the decision to select a channel is binary, then b¯ can be treated as a prediction,
with a probability p = 1 that b = b¯. The outcome of this decision is the unknown parameter
b which can be either a loss or a benefit. With that in consideration, we resolve Lb¯ into
two independent functions L1(b) = L(b, 1) and L0(b) = L(b, 0). L1(b) is associated with the
decision of the network to pick the select channel for transmission and L0(b) is associated
with the decision of the networks not to pick the channel.
Here, we introduce Q as a probability measure on the set of binary outcome {0, 1}, such
that Prb∈Q[b = 0] = q. The expected loss for the probability measure Q, for an outcome
b ∈ [0, 1] is defined as
Eb∈Q[L(b, b¯)] = q · L1(b) + (1− q) · L0(b) (4.13)
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With the selection an arbitrary channel selected, a network risk losing the time slot with
probability q. The main goal is to minimize the amount of loss incurred. Based on the loss
equation, no loss is incurred if the channel was interference-free. Therefore the expected loss
in that case results to zero. On the other hand, the network’s refusal to pick a channel could
result to a loss. This happens with a probability 1− q when the channel is interference-free.
Note that no loss is incurred if the channel turns out to be busy. In fact, if the networks are
not interested in verifying the resulting state of a rejected channel, then the equation 4.13
simply reduces to
Eb∈Q[L(b, b¯)] = q · L1(b) (4.14)
Risk has no scale of measurement and can be expressed in terms of expected loss. The
general representation of risk is a function mapping a random variable, which belongs to a
set of possible real outcomes ω, to a set of real numbers R. The general form of the function
is given below,
ρ : X → R ∪ {∞} (4.15)
We denote the risk as a certain measurable quantity of loss associated with a channel C
as ρ(Cj). The function L allows the networks to measure the quality of Cj by quantifying it
in terms of the cumulative loss recorded while transmitting over channel Cj. The cumulative





If the quality of C is degrading, we expect L(Cj) to increase significantly, thereby increasing
the risk of operation. Hence, we can define a risk function as ρ(Cj) = E[L(Cj)]. With this
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definition, E[L(Cj)] becomes a measurable quantity in retrospect of past failed attempts to
transmit over channel Cj.
Precisely, we can define risk as a measure that quantifies the vulnerability of a network to
experience spectrum contention while transmitting over a channel. This measure of risk does
take into consideration the frequency of spectrum contentions as well as the persistence of
conflicts on each channel. Based on channel profile information accumulated by a network,
we can make inference on the probability of selecting a specific channel. The probability
of selecting channel j can be approximated, according to the law of large number, to the
frequency fj of channel j’s selection divided by the total time slots of network activity TA.
Likewise, the probability of spectrum contention can be approximated as the frequency of
contention f cj on channel j divided by usage frequency fj of channel j. The network risks
recording a cumulative loss (cost of spectrum contention), L(Cj) =
∑
t∈TA+1 L(bt, b¯t) if it
selects channel j for the next transmission round. Therefore, the risk ρ(Cj) associated with









f cj · L(Cj)
TA
(4.17)
If we assume a unit cost for each loss incurred, then L(Cj) sums up to f cj . Thus, we can
rewrite equation 4.17 as
ρ(Cj) =
f cj · (f cj + 1)
TA
(4.18)
4.4.3 Risk-Motivated Channel Selection Scheme
During channel selection, networks pick channels to operate on based on the channel char-
acteristics. A rational network’s choice should be guided by accumulated knowledge about
the activities of the channel. In our model, we consider that primary users are absent and
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only secondary users are operating on the available channels. Therefore, the competition for
the available channels is strictly between secondary users, with no prior agreement on the
order of spectrum access.
At the beginning of a transmission period, a network has to pick the best channel(s). We
propose a channel selection scheme that involves ranking of channels based on their levels
of perceived spectrum contention risk. As discussed above, high risk of spectrum contention
indicates a potential for low throughput, excluding the losses incurred due to the presence
of licensed owners. Channel ranking is carried as follows:
• Rank Ci above Cj if ρ(Ci) < ρ(Cj)
• In case of ρ(Ci) = ρ(Cj), rank Ci above Cj if u(Ci) > u(Cj)
• Otherwise, break tie via coin toss.
A network initiates deference structure formation once the risk ρ(Cj) of the highest ranked
channel exceeds acceptable level of spectrum contention risk, denoted as ρo. In our model,
each network is constrained to pick the best channel for transmission. Assuming that Cj is
the best channel and ρ(Cj) > ρo, then there is no incentive to select an arbitrary channel Ci
for transmission, where ρ(Ci) ≥ ρ(Cj). Spectrum contention risk on the best channel exceeds
ρo and this motivates the network to initiate the deference structure formation process. The
network that starts the process is referred to as the initiator network. It starts by sending
out the REQ message, advertising the preferred deference channel for collaborative access.
Any network that receives the REQ message makes a rational decision to accept or
ignore the request. Since the received REQ packet contains information about the potential
deference channel, network can compare the risk associated with the advertised channel
with the risks of other channel. Let Cj denote the advertised channel and ρ(Cj) as the risk
associated with it. A response is issued if
CHAPTER 4. RISK-MOTIVATED DEFERENCE STRUCTURE FORMATION 104
• ρ(Cj) > ρo or ∀C 6= Cj , ρ(C) ≤ ρ(Cj), and
• ρ(Cj) ≥ ρ(Sj)
where ρ(Sj) is the risk of the potential deference structure Sj to be formed.
4.4.4 Deference Structure Coalition Formation as a Game
Coalition formation in cognitive radio networks have been studied from a game theoretical
perspective [94] [95]. One of the notable works on coalition formation is the work done by
Khan et al. on selfish and altruistic formation in cognitive radio networks. The coalition
formation problem was formulated as a sensing-throughput tradeoff problem in distributed
cognitive radio networks. A value decision function was introduced to encourage collaborative
networks to join coalitions to minimize their false alarm probabilities.
Along the same line, we argue that CR networks can be encouraged to form deference
structures to minimize the amount of spectrum contention risk they face in the spectral
environment. The risk measure is used as an incentive to encourage networks to join deference
structures to minimize conflicts. Let N denote the set of players (networks) participating in
the coalition game to access a set of available bands M . Each player i ∈ N seek to minimize
spectrum contention risk on preferred channel j ∈M . A player i choose to transmit on j if
j = arg min
m∈M
ρ(Cm) (4.19)
Thus, deference structure coalition Sj is set of players such that Sj ⊆ N , where N is the
grand coalition. An individual network i that does not belong to any deference structure is
a singleton deference structure, denoted as S
(i)
j . The valuation of a given deference structure
coalition v(Sj) can be measured in terms of cumulative utility derived by DS coalition Sj by
transmitting over channel j. The definition of utility have been given earlier in section 4.3.
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Definition 5. A coalitional game (N, v, ρ) has a transferable utility if the value v(Sj) of
a coalition Sj can be distributed among players in any conceivable way. In a case, where
each player has its own utility within the S, then the coalition game is said to have non-
transferable.
Proposition 4.4.1. In the proposed deference structure game model, the utility derived by





Consequently, deference structure game model has transferable utility.
Proof. Without any external disturbance, utility derived by the DS coalition Sj is measure-
able in terms of the utility obtainable while operating on Cj. Suppose that duration of
active operation by members of Sj can be partitioned into transmission time slots. Then,
each network receives a certain amount of time slots by virtue of its membership to Sj. The
total utility derived by the coalition Sj is given as v(Sj) =
∑
Ni∈N ui(Cj), where ui(Cj) is
the utility derived by Ni from assigned time slots. Hence, the DS coalition value v(Sj) can
be arbitrary apportioned among members. This coincides with the premise of DS coali-
tion formation, which is based on the ability of CR networks to defer transmission to one
another.
Definition 6. A coalition game (N, v, ρ) has a transferable risk if ρ(Sj) of a coalition Sj
can be distributed among players in any conceivable way. Otherwise, a risk-motivated coali-
tion game has non-transferable utility if each player faces an individual risk by virtue of its
membership to Sj.
Proposition 4.4.2. The deference structure game model has non-transferable risk.
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Proof. By agreeing to form a DS coalition Sj, any network Ni ∈ Sj pledges not to interfere
with the operations of a member network Nk ∈ Sj \Ni. Thus, Sj as a unit can only contend
with any other coalition Rj where Rj ⊂ N and Rj ∪ Sj = ∅. The spectrum contention risk
faced by Sj is denoted as ρ(Sj). By virtue of membership to Sj to operate uninterrupted
on channel Cj, the risk ρi(Sj) faced by Ni equals the risk faced by the DS coalition Sj i.e.
ρ(Sj) = ρi(Sj) and vice versa. Irrespective of the division of DS coalition utility, members
share the same risk of spectrum contention ρ(Sj). Hence, deference structure game model
has non-transferable spectrum contention risk.
We denote the spectrum contention risk, associated with a given deference structure Sj
formed on channel j, as ρ(Sj). We envision a coalition game where each member i of Sj
faced a certain risk of spectrum contention ρ(S
(i)
j ) prior to its formation. The risk faced by
Ni after the formation of Sj is denoted as ρi(Sj). The minimized risk ρmin = supSj⊂N ρ(Sj)
serves as an incentive for networks to join a DS coalition on a particular channel.
Proposition 4.4.3. A sufficient incentive for the emergence of DS coalition is the reduction
in spectrum contention risk.
Proof. Assume that there is sufficient supply of spectrum resources and zero contention in the
system. Then no rational CR network joins a DS coalition to minimize spectrum contention
risk. However, this is contradictory to the case of spectrum scarcity where n > m.
Players are better off sharing than competing for the spectrum resources because compe-
tition generates no utility and leads to wastage of spectrum opportunity. The formation of
deference structure should also take into consideration the cost of coordinating a DS coali-
tion. The coordination cost increases as the size of the deference structure |Sj| increases.
The motivating criteria for a player i to form or join a deference structure on channel j are:
1. The spectrum contention risk ρ(Cj) exceeds acceptable risk threshold ρo.
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2. Player i anticipates that joining Sj changes ρ(Cj) to ρ(Sj) faced by the members of
Sj, where ρ(Sj) ≤ ρ(Cj).
A selfish deference structure is formed when players respond to request, seeking to mini-
mize spectrum contention risk and consequently maximize throughput. Given two deference
structures Si and Sj, the emergence of a selfish deference structure is possible if only
ρ(Si ∪ Sj) < min{ρ(Si), ρ(Sj)}
Due to the condition above, whenever a request to form deference structure is sent out,
the networks might have no incentive to remain as singleton deference structures. As ra-
tional entities, minimizing the spectrum contention risk is important to keep the spectral
environment fairly stable for transmission purposes.
In some cases, the formation of a deference structure may not be entirely motivated by
selfish interest of the network maximize utility. Networks can be altruistic with the risk
they face in their coalition. Consider the emergence of an outsider network i in the spectral
environment, with interest to form a deference structure of channel j. Prior to the appearance
of network i, a deference structure Sj existed on the deference channel j. The presence of
network i does not pose significant risk to the existence of Sj, since network i might be
hopping from one channel to another seeking to find the best channel for transmission. If
Sj accepts to merge with i to form a deference structure, then the resulting coalition could
be said to be altruistic in nature. Therefore, the condition for the emergence of an altruistic
deference structure Sj ∪ S(i)j is as follows
ρ(Sj) ≤ ρ(Sj ∪ S(i)j ) < ρ(S(i)j )
The contribution made by Sj is measurable in terms of the change in risk ∆ρ = ρ(Sj ∪
S
(i)
j )− ρ(Sj). The condition given above is valid, if and only if we assume that there could
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be an increment in risk with an increase in the size of the deference structure. On the
other hand, the merging of deference structures should generally remove the competition
that exists between the structures, and thereby reduces the risk of contention. Taking this
into consideration, Sj might be still be considered to be altruistic, provided it is indifferent
to the gains in terms of reduction in risk. Therefore, the following inequality,
ρ(Sj ∪ S(i)j ) ≤ ρ(Sj) < ρ(S(i)j )
holds only if and only if Sj is indifferent to the improvement in spectrum contention risk.
Proposition 4.4.4. For a given collection {Si} of disjoint DS singletons, the joint spectrum
contention risk of an emerging DS coalition S =
⋃




provided ∀Si, Si 6= ∅ and ρ(Si) 6= 0.
Proof. By the inspecting the equation p = 1 − e−n(n−1)/2m, we observe that as the number
of contenders n decreases, p decreases which implies a reduction in ρ(Cj) for any arbitrary
selected channel j ∈ [1,m]. With the emergence of the new DS coalition ∪iSi, the number
of potential contenders of Cj decreases from n to n −
∑
i |Si| + 1. This signifies a decrease
in probability of spectrum contention and corresponding decrease in risk of spectrum con-
tention. Suppose n = 4 with fixed m, then after the emergence of the DS coalition involving
n/2 of the CR networks present, the probability of spectrum contention reduces by approxi-
mately e−3/m − e−6/m. This is a quite significant improvement, depending on the number of
channels m that is available.
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Figure 4.4: Variation of probability of spectrum contention with n and m.
4.4.5 Stability of Deference Structures
A DS coalition is expected to last as long as the condition for its formation remains valid.
That is, provided ρ(Sj) is maintained below each member’s risk threshold ρ(S
(i)
j ). However,
this might not be the only incentive for deviation by the members. The discovery of idle
channel(s) could force networks to abandon already negotiated resources for the anticipation
of contention-free transmission. A network decision to switch from one channel is accom-
panied by the notion that the target channel has lesser spectrum contention risk. Another
important factor that can make DS unstable is the return of the primary user to the defer-
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ence channel. This implies that members have to renew their search for a new coalition for a
contention-free transmission. Otherwise, the DS coalition will have to be dormant until the
occupied channel becomes free. In a case, where transmitted data are time-sensitive informa-
tion, it is more beneficial for networks to switch to another available channel. Analytically,
the instability of DS coalitions is the consequence of
1. a singleton deference structure S
(i)
j ⊂ Sj discovering an alternative channel Ck such
that the spectrum contention risk of operating on Ck is strictly less than the spectrum
contention risk on Cj i.e. ρ(Ck) < ρ(Sj).
2. activities of an adversary DS coalition or singleton deference structure Rj, that in-
creases ρ(Sj) beyond acceptable threshold.
4.5 Numerical and Simulation Results
We modeled experiments to show that the benefit of having deference structure in a system of
networks. In the simulations, we assumed that the spectrum resources are limited in supply
and some CR networks are willing to form deference structure coalition with other networks
while others are not. The networks that eventually form a deference structure coalition
are regarded as insider networks. The networks that prefer to operate independently are
regarded as outsider networks. Systems, consisting of insider networks, are described as
deference structure (DS) system. A system is referred to as non-DS (NDS) system, if it has
no insider networks. We consider a distributed system where networks can communicate
over common control channels assigned to the system. As part of the system requirement,
message exchanges are conducted over a control channel implementing cognitive radio MAC
protocol such as CR-MAC [96] and C-MAC [97] protocols. Both protocols are time-slotted
with synchronized frame. In our case, the control channel was implemented like rendezvous
channel in C-MAC [97] and are available throughout the duration of the simulation.
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Figure 4.5: An illustration of the difference in performance between systems in DS and
NDS modes. In each mode, the number of networks N = 12 and networks are free to
join any arbitrary deference structure to satisfy channel requirement and mitigate spectrum
contention.
4.5.1 Impact of Deference Structure Mechanism on System Per-
formance
In our experiment, we observed that the formation of deference structures in the system
impacted positively on the system performance. The simulated system is composed of 12
static networks competing for access to a varied number of channels M . The networks are all
within conflicting range, and therefore form a system with complete conflict graph topology.
The networks dynamically form deference structures of variable sizes based on perceived
spectrum contention risk level. A common control channel is reserved for message exchanges
leading to the formation of deference structures.
The results, illustrated in figure 4.5, show that DS system derives more benefit than the
NDS system. Performance of DS and NDS were evaluated based on system utility derived
during the simulation period. Utility is measured in terms of number of time frames that
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Figure 4.6: An illustration of deference structure formation constraints. Network N5 is not
allowed to join multiple deference structures formed on channel CH3.
networks were able to operate without interference, including the period before and after
the formation of deference structures. The results clearly show that the DS system generate
more utility than NDS system, irrespective of the number of available channels, M . Based
on these results, we say that the presence of deference structures leads to significant gains
in system utility. The improvement in performance is accounted for by the reduction in the
number of spectrum contentions encountered by insider networks, since they are no longer
contending on channels of interest.
We also investigated the individual benefit derived by networks when they participate in
deference structure formation. For this experiment, we specifically programmed the network
models to initially compete for the spectrum access and then dynamically form deference
structures as the risk in the system increases. An additional constraint was imposed on
the system that disallows networks to belong to multiple deference structures with same
deference channel. This implies that a network can belong to multiple deference structures
but the channels chosen for those structures must be distinct.
In Figure 4.6, we have consisting of 5 CR nodes, with the edges between nodes indicating
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Figure 4.7: A comparison of system performance in DS and NDS mode. A significant
improvement is observed for networks that join deference structure.
the possible coalition that can be formed. Basically, members of a deference structure form
a clique. The edges are labeled using the deference channel identity. For instance, deference
structure formed the set {N1, N2, N3} is valid. On the other hand, the deference structures
{N1, N5} and {N4, N5} are invalid. The reason is that network N5 would be benefiting
after combining the transmission time slots obtained from both deference structures. This
is malicious because N1 and N4 may not be aware of the N5’s actions. The situation can
be normalized by setting up an additional edge between N1 and N5 to form a clique.
The experiments were conducted in two different modes - DS and NDS mode, with n = 10
networks. In the NDS mode, no network is willing to form a deference structure to access the
channel of interest. However, in the DS mode, some networks are insiders while others are
outsiders. The insider networks include {N5, N6, N7, N8, N9, N10} and the outsider consist of
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Figure 4.8: Percentage increase in network utility with the emergence of DS coalitions.
networks {N1, N2, N3, N4}. Experimental results based on performance of the networks are
illustrated in Figure 4.7.
Upon comparing the results from the two settings, we can clearly see that the average
performance of the insider networks is far better than the outsider networks. The outsider
networks’ average performance degraded compared to their performance in the NDS mode.
Figure 4.8 shows the percentage increase with the implementation of the deference structure
mechanism. The Jain’s fairness index for the insider gave a value of 0.99, highlighting the
high degree of fairness in the DS coalitions.
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4.5.2 Impact of Coalition Size on Average Network Utility and
Contention
The number of networks that respond to the deference structure request message plays an
important role on average utility derived from a DS coalition. This is because the formation
of the DS coalition would subsequently lead to spectrum sharing, in a TDMA fashion, by
the networks that responded to the request.
We investigated the impact of DS coalition size, denoted as κ, on average network utility
per timeslot. For the sake of conciseness, we refer to average network utility per time slot
as the network’s utility rate. Basically, average coalition size correlates with the number of
insider networks willing to participate in DS coalition formation. On the other hand, the
resulting size of a deference structure coalition depends on the risk levels on the contended
channels. Since we are investigating a dynamic system of networks, we expect the DS
coalition sizes to vary, given the scarce supply of spectrum resources. Results show the
dependency of the utility rate on average coalition size of DS coalitions.
In our experimental setup, we emulated a system of networks with insufficient supply of
spectrum resources by setting N = 50 and M = 35. For networks to derive any form of
benefit, they would have to form DS coalitions and share the spectrum resources in TDMA
manner. This implies that the time frames are partitioned into equal time slots for members
of a given DS coalition.
Figure 4.9 illustrates the variation of network’s utility rate with κ. We can observe that
the insider networks have higher utility rate than outsider networks. The trend suggests
that as κ increases, the average utility of the insiders gradually increases, while that of the
outsiders decreases towards zero percent utility. The maximum utility for insider networks
reaches a peak at κ = 35, which corresponds to the number of channels available for con-
tention. The insider networks are not able to achieve 100% utility rate because they have to
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Figure 4.9: Comparison of insider and outsider networks performance based on utility rate.
share the available resources, which is insufficient given the number of networks present.
Figure 4.10 shows the variation of system utility and contention rates with κ. We can
observe that an increase in κ increases utility rate of spectrum resources. Likewise, we
can observe that the amount of spectrum contention recorded in the system diminishes as
κ increases. The more networks are organized into DS coalitions, the more the reduced
spectrum contention recorded in the system. The insider networks are able to minimize
spectrum contention and boost spectrum utilization. However, the presence of the outsider
networks poses considerable spectrum contention risk to their overall performance.
The formation of deference structures has been shown to be beneficial to the CR networks,
but we observe a tipping point after which admission of an additional insider network triggers
a decline in utility rate. An increase in κ with fixed time slots on the deference channel leads
to a reduction in the number of transmission slots that each member network gets. This
impacts negatively on the system utility.
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Figure 4.10: Variation of system’s contention and utility rates with DS coalition sizes.
Figure 4.11 shows the variation of the utility rate with different DS coalition sizes for
different values of M . With a fixed number of spectrum bands M , utility rate reaches a
peak and starts to decay with further increase in κ. The peak utility rate is attained when
κ ≈ M . This can be interpreted as the limit beyond which the utility rate of the networks
degrades. Intuitively, additional members to the coalition would increase coordination cost
and average waiting time that delays network’s access to the spectrum. Therefore, it is
might be important for the initiator network to estimate the optimal κ prior to issuing a DS
formation request. In the request, the initiator can put a cap on the required DS coalition
size. Networks are then admitted into the DS coalition based on first-come, first-serve basis.
This will help reduce the coordination and waiting costs to a minimum and maximize the
utility derived by the insider networks.
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Figure 4.11: Performance comparison of different DS coalition sizes with varying M , number
of spectrum bands. The performance reaches a peak when κ ≈M .
4.6 Conclusions
In this work, we found out that the formation of deference structure coalitions helps to foster
coexistence of cognitive radio networks. The presence of DS coalitions improves spectrum
utility and minimizes spectrum contentions between spectrum contenders. Valuation of any
DS coalition can be done based on either network utility rate or risk of spectrum contention.
The risk-motivated channel selection scheme suggested guides networks in making decision
regarding the formation of DS coalitions. We also discussed the DS coalition formation
protocol. We identified that the main factors that spur the DS formation process include
spectrum starvation as well as persistence spectrum contention on preferred channels.
We also demonstrated via simulation the relationship between size κ of the deference
structure community and the utility derived by the CR networks. We were able to show that
the existence of DS coalitions is beneficial, as utility is observed to increase as κ increases.
The simulation results obtained also demonstrate the impact of size κ of deference structure
coalitions on the performance of the member networks and suggest the determination of an
optimal κ for the best network performance.
Chapter 5
Mitigating against Intelligent Sybil
Attacks using a Dynamic Reputation
System
In this chapter, we explore the dynamic behavior of the Sybil attacker that operates in a
CR network where CR nodes collaborate to perform distributed spectrum sensing. The CR
nodes then report the results to a centralized Fusion Center (FC), responsible for fusing the
spectrum reports and taking decision on spectrum availability. Each node has a unique iden-
tity associated with every sensing report it makes to the FC about the spectrum state. The
attacker is capable of generating multiple false sensing reports directed at the FC with the
help of its multiple Sybil identities. We implement a number of identity sampling strategies
that an attacker can use to select the number of identities k to be used for false reporting.
Based on feedback from the FC and with the help of reinforcement learning (RL), the Sybil
dynamically adjusts k for the next stage of attack.
We present an adaptive dynamic reputation system for spectrum decision making by the
fusion center (FC). The dynamic reputation system relies on a non-linear reputation function
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to compute the reputation of a cognitive radio node. Each node is assigned a separate
reputation function that evaluates its reputation based on false and correct reporting rates.
Based on attained reputation, nodes can be distinguished into honest and malicious nodes.
However, the reputation system does not sideline the malicious nodes completely by ignoring
their reports. Rather the system considers that maliciousness might sometimes be induced
and creates an opportunity for nodes to recover from this kind of setback. The reactionary
measures are implemented with the help of fuzzy logic control techniques. A fuzzy logic (FL)
controller is designed to dynamically adjust the value of λ which is an important component
of the reputation function. With the support of the feedback control technology, the FL
control based dynamic reputation system guarantees accurate spectrum decision-making by
FC based on the reputation of nodes.
The key contributions of this chapter are as follows:
1. An overview of intelligent and context-aware Sybil attack in a Cognitive Radio Net-
work. We model Sybil attacks as intelligence-based attacks that rely on the Reinforce-
ment Learning technique, Q-learning, to dynamically select identities for attacks. The
most important aspect of the model is capability of an attacker to learn its environment
and use the knowledge obtained to carry out intelligent and sophisticated attacks.
2. A novel reputation system that tracks the reputations of spectrum state reporting
cognitive radio nodes. We propose the Dynamic Reputation system, which provides
the security framework to mitigate the impact of malicious Sybil nodes on spectrum
decision. The Dynamic reputation system controlled by the Fusion Center relies on
non-linear reputation functions to compute reputations. The reputation system was
shown to be flexible but robust to the accuracy of spectrum reports.
3. Fuzzy logic controlled reputation function. We propose the use of fuzzy logic to control
the reputation function parameter λ that is considered very important in reputation
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evaluation. This provides the reactionary mechanism that is needed to respond to
changes in reporting behavior of nodes by dynamically adjusting the reputation growth
rate λ.
4. Extensive experiments to highlight the following: effectiveness of Intelligence-based
Sybil attacks, flexibility and robustness of the Dynamic Reputation System in coun-
teracting malicious attacks and dynamic/responsive control of reputation functions
using fuzzy logic controllers.
5.1 System Model
This section provides an insight into cognitive radio network model that is center to our
study on Sybil attacks and reputation system mitigate the impact of the attacks. The
cognitive radio network in perspective consists of N cognitive radio (CR) nodes equipped
with spectrum sensing capability. The cognitive radio nodes are allowed to sense m ∈ M
where M is the total number of spectrum bands available. All nodes periodically sense the
spectrum bands and report their results to the Fusion Center (FC). After reporting, all nodes
wait for FC’s decision before commencing activity in the spectrum.
CR nodes can be compromised or become malicious and therefore could forward erroneous
report to the FC. In a situation, where these erroneous reports are reported using multiple
identities, we refer to the CR node as a Sybil attacker. The aim of the Sybil attacker is to
maximally corrupt sensing result, thereby forcing the FC into wrong conclusions. Wrong
conclusions drawn by the FC are costly because that could lead to either under-exploitation
of the spectrum or conflicts with the primary user. The attacker derives its utility by
successfully causing a disruption in the efficient use of the scarce spectrum resources.
In reporting, CR nodes send their bit reports together with their unique IDs to the FC. A
channel with primary user present is reported as busy with a bit value 1 and one with primary
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user absent is reported as free with a bit value 0. In the case of multiple channel report,
the channel ID is included in the report; to specify which channel the report is intended
for. Nodes are error-prone and can give false report about the state of channel(s). In this
model, node behavior is measured per interval. An interval is comprised of a finite number
of rounds, determined by the FC, during which nodes’ reporting accuracies are measured.
FC is not aware of the false reporting rates of the nodes during in an interval. The false
reporting rates of the nodes are modeled using the Poisson distribution. This implies that
in a given interval, the average rate of false reporting of a node is defined by the parameter
µavg. The use of Poisson distribution to model the reporting behavior of nodes makes it
possible to capture spontaneous change in false reporting rate, which is possible strategy
that a malicious node can adopt to foment an attack. Also the strategy of malicious nodes
being passive for some time to gain reputation before attacking the system is also captured
by this distribution.
FC has the capability to verify the reports made by CR nodes with the help of policy
nodes [67] or simply by “listening” on the channels to detect contentions or white spaces.
The verification process allows the FC to extract important information about each node
false reporting rate. However, there is an error associated with the verification process, which
we refer to as verification error. False reporting rates of nodes are measured periodically and
with the help of the reputation system, decisions about spectrum state are made. Decision
is reached in such a way that the malicious nodes’ reports would have minimal or no impact
on the final spectrum decision.
5.2 The Sybil Attacker
We assume that Sybil attacker can generate up to M identities. For example, in our experi-
mental test bed setup, Soekris Net-5501 boards enabled with Atheros chipsets based Wireless
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NIC and programmable Madwifi device driver, we are able to support up to 64 identities
for one physical device [98]. The attacker is aware of FC’s vigilance on relegating suspicious
identities by assigning low reputation to those identities. At every stage of reporting, it uses
k ∈ [0 · · ·M ] to report falsely and M − k to report truly the spectrum state. Since the
main objective of the attacker is to avoid detection which reduces its reputation but at the
same time maximize impact on the FC’s decision, it should selectively choose the k identities
used for the attack. The selection is done such that the frequency of use of each identity
in reporting to the FC is kept under control. Later on, we shall consider various identity
sampling strategies including the identity hopping strategy used by the attacker.
5.2.1 Sybil Attacker Learning Strategy
The Sybil attacker’s goal is to maximize the effectiveness of its attacks (i.e. its performance)
on the FC. The attacks have to be unpredictable and in such a manner that the Sybil
identities are not compromised. In considering the optimality of k, the Sybil attacker has
to consider its level of success in the previous stages of attacks. The knowledge of its
previous attack strategies that were successful will enhance the decision making process of
the attacker in ascertaining the right number of identities to use in embarking on an attack.
It must be noted that since the cumulative number of successful attacks varies in each time
slot, k needs to be kept dynamic. Another reason why k should be varied is to accommodate
the mechanism that allow identities to recover their reputation after a period of intensive
attacks. Keeping k constant could reveal the periodicity or the distribution used in sampling
the identities.
Given the complexity and dynamism of the wireless environment, reinforcement learning
(RL) can provide the Sybil attacker the context awareness and intelligence to conduct its
attack efficiently in the system. RL have been applied in many aspect of wireless network such
as routing, resource management and dynamic channel selection. We adopt the Q-learning
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algorithm in learning the Sybil attacker on the best k to use at any level of performance
measure.
When making false reports with k of its identities, the goal of an attacker is to force
the FC to accept whatever those identities reported. Let Z(t) ∈ {0, 1} be an indicator
function of time that shows whether FC concluded in favor of the attacker. The attacker
risks exposing the k identities if it decides to use all of them at once. The attacker associates
a cost K(t)/M with the exposure, where K(t) is a function that returns the value of k at time
t. An attacker can have a variable belief θ ∈ [0, 1] which represents its level of conviction that
the identities will be penalized by the FC for false reporting. So after tc stages of attacks,
attacker’s perceived performance P (tc) ∈ [0, 1] is expressed as follows:
P (tc) =
1
M · tc ·
tc∑
t=1
[M · Z(t)− θ · K(t)] (5.1)
In a case where θ = 0, which indicates attacker’s utmost confidence that its identities would








With θ = 1, which indicates that the attacker is certain of the risk of exposure, we can observe
the dependency of P (tc) on the value of k used at each stage of the attack. There is no gain for
the attacker using k = M in all the stages of the attack, even if all attacks were successful. So it
is not in the best interest of the attacker to use all its identities but rather intelligently choose k of
best fit for an attack.
For the purpose of implementing RL based Sybil attack, we need to define the terms: state and
action. We define a state st of an attacker as an indicator of its performance level at time t. The
attacker defines an arbitrary finite number of states η solely to differentiate its performances level
and learn the best action to take at each level. The range of P (tc) ∈ [0, 1] is partitioned into η
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possible intervals and each interval is associated with a unique state. For an example, η = 41 and
P (tc) uniformly partitioned, the state st of an attacker can be given as:
st =

1 0.0 ≤ P (t) < 0.25
2 0.25 ≤ P (t) < 0.5
3 0.5 ≤ P (t) < 0.75
4 0.75 ≤ P (t) < 1.0
Worst performance of attacker is therefore associated with state st = 1, and the best performance,
with the state st = 4. For a uniformly partitioned interval, st can be expressed concisely as
st = dP (t) · ηe, st ∈ Z>0
An action, however, is defined by the number of identities k that is used by attacker in making
false report to FC. For example in state st = 3, an attacker can choose to use k = 4 identities,
where k ∈ [1,M ], to make false report. Using Q-learning, some other important parameters include
learning rate denoted by α and discount factor denoted by γ. The reward r is dependent on the
success of an attack and k. In the case of success the reward assigned is inversely proportional
to the k but in case of failure, the reward is negative and directly proportional to k. The reward
is designed in such a manner to discourage any tendency to “greedy attack” i.e. k → M . The
Q-learning algorithm uses the function Q : S×A → R to compute the quality of a state s ∈ S after
performing an action a ∈ A. S is a set of possible of states and A is a set of possible actions. After
carrying out an attack at time t, the attacker updates the value of the state-action pair (st, at) in
its Q-table as follows:
Qt+1(st, at) = Qt(st, at) + α ·
[





where st+1 and at+1 are the new state (after performing action at) and the best action in the
new state respectively. The iterative nature of the algorithm uncovers the best action to be taken
given a certain state of performance. The best action a∗, given the current state st, is the action
1η is a positive integer. η = 4 was chosen to demonstrate one of many possible ways an attacker can use
to determine its state, based on performance level.
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5.2.2 Identity Ranking Algorithm
An identity i used by the Sybil attacker is characterized by the number of successful attacks zi and
the number of exposures ei. To maintain a balance between the effectiveness of its attacks and its
reputation with the FC, attackers select identities that have been less exposed with high success
rate with respect to the number of exposures. So the first criterion ensures that the least exposed
identities are used in attack. The second criterion further ensures that the least exposed identities
have been effective in previous attacks.
The attacker can use the following algorithm to rank the identities, before selecting the best
k candidate identities for an attack. Let us assume that the attacker has a set of identities I =
{(zi, ei)|i ∈ M} to rank. We can decide to use a sorting algorithm (merge sort) with an optimal
complexity of O(nlogn) to rank the identities in ascending order. In that case the merge function is
modified as follows. Two identities i and j are compared based on the ratios zi/ei and zj/ej . The
identity with the least ratio is appended first. If the ratios of the identities are equal, then ei and
ej are compared. Since ei and ej are measures of exposure, the identity with the least exposure
is appended first. It is obvious that the complexity algorithm is not affected by the modification.
The outcome of the modified sorting algorithm is a set I∗ of ordered (ranked) identities.
5.2.3 Identity Sampling Strategies
The identity sampling strategy adopted by the Sybil attacker is targeted towards evading discovery
by the FC. The attacker can choose to sample its identities in a particular order that reduces the
frequency of their appearance in attacks. Some of the strategies that we considered are sliding
window, best performing k, and identity hopping.
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Sliding Window Strategy
The sliding window (SW) strategy selects identities based on specified window, whose size is con-
trolled by k. The identities are arranged in such an order that they form a loop. In each round, the
window slides fixed number of position(s) to the right. The identities that fall within the window
are used to conduct the attack. The identities are arranged to form a loop such that the window
simply wraps around. As we can see, the strategy ensures that in every round, one new identity is
featured and one old identity is withdrawn. The sliding window strategy exhibits periodicity, which
is dependent on the number of positions it slides across. As a result, the identities are periodically
sampled for the attack. An illustration of the sliding window identity sampling strategy can be
seen in Figure 5.1a.
(a) Periodicity, τ = 7 (b) Periodicity, τ = 3
Figure 5.1: Sliding Window Identity Sampling Strategy with k = 3.
Best Performing-k Strategy
In best performing k (BP) strategy, the attacker samples those identities obtained from the identity
ranking algorithm described. The algorithm is designed to favor the selection of identities with
relatively better performance per exposure, and ensures that identities with high failure rate are
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sampled less often. The best performing k strategies leverages this approach to inject some sort of
balance between success of an attack and the reputation of identities.
Identity Hopping Strategy
Inspired by the concept of frequency hopping mechanism [99], the identity hopping (IH) algorithm
is targeted towards generating a pseudo-random sequence of identities. It involves ranking of the
identities, which is carried out using the IR algorithm described. A pseudo-random sequence is
generated using the ranks of the identities. The sequence allows some bias towards identities that
are ranked high. Using a decreasing linear function, the number of occurrence yi of each identity
in the sequence is determined using the expression: yi = M − ri+ 1, where ri is the identity’s rank.
A decreasing parabolic function can also be used instead, defined as yi = (M − ri + 1)2. In this
work, we assume that linear function is used in the pseudo-random sequence generation. Consider
the following example of the pseudo-random sequence generation. Assuming that the identities are
ranked in the following order: {1, 4, 2, 5, 3}, then identity 1 occurs 5 times in the sequence, 4 occurs
4 times etc.
The k identities used in the attack are selected from the sequence with replacement. It is
obvious that the probability of selecting the highest ranked identity is high given that the length of
the sequence is M(M+1)/2. But we cannot ignore that it is still probable to pick an identity other
than highest ranked identity. The randomness associated with this strategy makes it difficult for
the FC to learn the sampling pattern of the Sybil attacker. The attacker achieves a dual goal here:
increasing the chances of selecting the best performing k identities and randomizing its choices.
5.3 Dynamic Reputation System
The Dynamic Reputation System we are about to discuss provides a flexible but robust framework
to counteract the effect of malicious activities on spectrum decision making process, especially in the
case of Sybil attacks [31], [36]. The reputation system is managed by the FC, which observes correct
reporting of CR nodes and computes their reputation of the nodes using reputation functions. The
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system is dynamic because the steepness of a reputation functions changes based on the perceived
performance of node to which it was assigned. Hence reputation functions play a vital role in
evaluating the likelihood of accurate reports made by nodes.
5.3.1 Reputation Function
The dynamic reputation system relies on reputation functions to assign reputation to nodes. Most
reputation mechanisms are implemented using a linear reputation function that is dependent on
nodes performance [7]. The problem with linear reputation system is that it penalizes every node
equally, even the honest nodes. There is no mechanism to deal with each node separately based
on its performance. Here, we introduce a reputation mechanism that relies on a non-linear repu-
tation function to compute the reputation of nodes. The reputation function is a non-decreasing








where λ is the steepness parameter that determine the rate of reputation growth for a node and








In making decision about channel state, the spectrum reports of nodes are combined in such a
way that their reputation2 values serve as weights to their various reports. Each i-th CR node is
assigned a reputation function Ri(k)which is used to compute the reputation of the node. At the
end of t-th observation interval, the number of correct reports made by node i is k = k¯i(t). The
2Reputation in this context can be interpreted as the trust FC has for a node to report correctly. In our
model, the opinions of nodes about their peers are not required by the FC. FC only listens to policy nodes
to confirm or verify spectrum state decisions.
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Figure 5.2: Reputation function curves for different λ values (L = λ).


















σj(τ) ∈ {0, 1} is an indicator function of accuracy for channel j during the observation interval
[Ts, Tf ].
The parameter λ is of prime importance in measuring the reputation of a node. A small value
of λ is indicative of node’s good performance in terms of accurate reporting. With small λ a node
builds its reputation faster with fewer accurate reporting. On the other hand, a large λ would keep
the reputation of a node low and will require a longer period of accurate reporting for a node to
prove itself with the FC.
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In figure 5.2, reputation functions for varying λ are illustrated. The observation interval T = 20
and we observe that reputation function tends to maximum reputation value Rmax(k) = 1.0 as the
number of correct reporting increases. The speed of attaining Rmax(k) can be seen to depend on λ,
which determines the steepness of a function curve. For nodes with λ = 3.75, fewer correct reports
k are needed attain maximum reputation Rmax(k) than nodes with λ = 9.25. For instance, consider
two nodes A and B kA = kB = 7 but different λ values, λ = 3.75 and λ = 9.25 respectively. By
equation 5.6, the reputation of the nodes are computed as RA = 0.97 and RB = 0.29. By virtue of
the reputation values, the reports of A would carry much more weight than those of B.
The update of λ by the FC is done at end of every observation interval [Ts, Tf ]. With the current
λ and the number of accurate reports ki(t) for the last observation interval, the FC computes the
change in λ, denoted as ∆λ. To determine the value of ∆λ ∈ [−1, 1], FC uses a Fuzzy Logic (FL)
control which is based on fuzzy membership functions and linguistic rules. We will be discussing
the FL controller for the reputation system in the next session.
5.3.2 Spectrum Decision Making
In dynamic system such as the cognitive radio networks, nodes operate on multiple spectrum bands
or channels. It has been shown that cooperative spectrum sensing and decision-making improves
efficiency of transmission and increases utility.
Consider a cooperative CR network with N active nodes operating on M channels implementing
a cooperative spectrum sensing (centralized or distributed). A node can be actively sensing and
reporting spectrum state for m of M available channels to the fusion center. CR nodes are allowed
to tender reports on as many channels as they can sense. The number of channels allocated to a
node might be depended on the number of channels that it reported and some other parameters.
A lot of chapters have been published on efficient spectrum allocation mechanisms (cite as many
chapter as possible), therefore no discussion on spectrum allocation will be done here.
At the end of every sensing phase, combined sensing reports of nodes produces a matrix S of
dimension N ×M . Each cell in S corresponds to a node i opinion about the state of the spectrum
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k. In order to simplify the complex scenario which may arise and lead incomplete information
because of nodes sensing only mi of the channels, we assume that mi = M for all nodes.
On the basis of the spectrum matrix S, a decision has to be reached on the actual state of
the spectrum bands based on the speculation of the CR nodes. The decision reached after number
of operations involving S is represented as a matrix A of dimension 1 ×M . We introduce R as
reputation matrix that influences the validity of the reports given by nodes. R is a diagonal matrix
of N ×N and R = (Rij) where
Rij = 0 if i 6= j∀i, j ∈ 1, · · · , N (5.9)
The elements of the diagonal matrix R is correspond to the reputation of the nodes. We chose
this matrix structure in representing reputation because it allows us to represent the spectrum
decision-making process as a series of matrix operations. This also allows to utilize the tools of
matrix operations in analyzing the decision making process.
In a case where M = 1 (one channel scenario), the decision about the channel state is taken
with the consideration of nodes’ reputations as follows. First compute the decision using weighted










0, if x¯k ≤ 0.5 (5.11a)
1, otherwise (5.11b)
where 0 indicates that the spectrum is vacant and can be used for transmission purposes and
1 indicates busy (primary user’s presence). So generalizing the process of evaluating the spectrum
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where J1,N is a matrix of ones and tr(.) returns the trace of a matrix, and in our case R. Finally,
the spectrum state matrix A is obtained, each element Ak is computed as
Ak = d(Xk) (5.14)
The vector A contains the final decision about the spectrum state. In a situation where all nodes
are honest and their reports accurate, the actual spectrum state A∗ would be equivalent. But as a
result of interference, poor sensing capability and activity of malicious agents, A∗ differs from A.
The estimation error vector is given as e = A∗−A and the mean squared error is given by the trace
of the error covariance matrix






The ability of nodes to report the spectrum might depend on some other factors such as the
nature of their locality (sparse or dense), and known capability of the nodes etc. These factors are
independent of the reputation of a node giving accurate report about the spectrum. For example
a node in one location might sense transmission in some bands better than others. With the
knowledge that the accuracy with which a node senses a channel clearly depends on its location,
we can assign weights to the node. The channels that it can sense clearly from its location are
assigned higher weights while other channels are assigned lower weights. This gives rise to a matrix
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W of weights with dimension N ×M . We assume that all nodes have unique position but the set
of channels, that they are capable of sensing, can sometimes overlap.
W is a binary matrix such that an element (W )ik ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether a node i can obtain
some information about channel j based on its proximity to the spectrum bands. Because of the
independence of W and R, equation 5.12 remains the same where as equation 5.13 becomes
X = {Xk : k = 1 · · ·M} (5.17)
Xk is computed as Xk = Zk/Uk where Z = J1,NY , U = J1,NRW and |U | = |Z|.
The reputation matrix R is computed or updated based on nodes’ competence to report the
spectrum state correctly. MSE is general measure of accuracy of the cooperative sensing carried out
by the network of CR nodes. It does not provide a means to ascertain the individual performance
of the nodes. It is quite obvious that R must be dynamic to be applied on S which varies with
time.
5.4 Fuzzy Logic Control
A close look at the reputation function (see Figure 5.2) will reveal the dependency of the reputation
of a node on λ. With a large λ, the reputation grows slower. This implies that it will take a node
a considerable number of accurate reporting to gain reputation with the fusion center. In contrast,
a small λ allows the reputation of a node to grow fast with fewer accurate reporting. The main
question arising is how the parameter is controlled such that honest nodes are assigned low λ
values and malicious nodes receive high λ values. Supposing that at end of a spectrum reporting
observation interval each node has a certain λ and a corresponding number of observed correct
reports µ. Based on these input parameters, the change δλ to be made to λ is computed as part of
the update of the reputation parameter.
We consider spectrum reporting as a fuzzy process, where honest nodes can sometimes be delin-
quent and give inaccurate reports. Such behaviors among honest nodes are short-lived; otherwise
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Figure 5.3: Architecture of a fuzzy logic controller for λ control.
they would simply resemble malicious nodes. Using a fixed threshold to penalize nodes by increas-
ing their λ values does not accommodate such unintentional and short-lived false reporting and
makes honest nodes vulnerable to be perceived as malicious. To prevent this kind of scenario,
we propose the use of fuzzy logic controller to decide how nodes reputation parameters would be
adjusted to control their reputation functions. Since the reporting behavior could be fuzzy, it is
particularly reasonable to have fuzzy rules that decides how λ should be adjusted. A fuzzy logic
controller that provides a feedback control would be suitable to handle such spontaneous transition
from being honest to being malicious and vice versa. The use of fuzzy logic control might not be
the only approach to dynamically control the value λ but one that is best suited and feasible for the
dynamic process of spectrum reporting. Fuzzy logic control is known to be a non-linear adaptive
control method based on artificial intelligence (AI) and provides the robust control that is much
desired in dynamic systems [80]. It has proven to be a powerful technique for controlling processes
that are quite difficult to model and linearize [76].
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Figure 5.4: Membership functions of input variable λ.
An illustration of a typical fuzzy logic controller (FLC) architecture is presented in figure 5.3.
FLC comprises of the fuzzification module, the inference module and the defuzzification module.
The modules have specific roles they play in the control process. The fuzzification module is
responsible for converting the crisp values of λ and µ into fuzzy values with the help of fuzzy
membership functions assigned to the fuzzy sets. For λ we have three fuzzy sets LOW, MEDIUM,
HIGH with membership functions as fL(λi), fM (λi) and fH(λi) respectively. Each measured value
λi has a degree of membership with each fuzzy set that lies in the interval [0, 1]. The membership
functions of λ fuzzy sets are illustrated in figure 5.4. Three fuzzy sets are defined for µ, which include
LOW, MEDIUM and HIGH with membership functions as gL(µi), gM (µi) and gH(µi) respectively.
The membership functions for the fuzzy sets of µ are illustrated in figure 5.5. Measured values of µi
are first normalized and then mapped to values in the interval [0, 1] by the membership functions
to obtain their fuzzy equivalents.
The transformation of the measured crisp values of λ and µ into fuzzy sets, makes them com-
patible with fuzzy set representation of the linguistic variables in fuzzy rules. We denote the set of
fuzzy rules as Γ = {Γi | i ∈ [1, |Γ|]}.
The inference module computes for each fuzzy rule the overall control output derived from the
individual components of the rule. The components of rules are outputs of the fuzzification module
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Figure 5.5: Membership functions of input variable µ.
that represent the original crisp values. The fuzzification outputs are matched to each fuzzy rule
and the degree of match for each rule is computed. The degree of match is representative of the
degree of satisfaction of a fuzzy rule and together they form a set of fuzzy control output for the
inference module.
The fuzzy rules represent the control policy or strategy space of an experienced FC to tackle
false reporting and make accurate decisions. A fuzzy rule consist of an antecedent or premise part
and the consequence or conclusion part. The rule-antecedent comprises of the values of λ and µ
and the consequence of the rule denotes the type of action taken by the FC. An action is either to
(slightly) increase or (slightly) decrease λ by ∆λ or keep the value unchanged. The fuzzy rules3,
generated for the FL control, are as follows:
1. if λ is LOW & µ is LOW then ∆λ is NCHG
2. if λ is LOW & µ is MEDIUM then ∆λ is SINC
3. if λ is LOW & µ is HIGH then ∆λ is INC
4. if λ is MEDIUM & µ is LOW then ∆λ is DEC
3The number of fuzzy rules used for fuzzy inference is dependent on the number of fuzzy sets defined for
the FLC and the overlaps between the fuzzy sets. We can recall that by definition, a fuzzy set is defined for
a particular linguistic variable. In our case, we have 3 possible linguistic variables for the fuzzy input and 5
linguistic variables for the fuzzy output.
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5. if λ is MEDIUM & µ is MEDIUM then ∆λ is INC
6. if λ is MEDIUM & µ is HIGH then ∆λ is INC
7. if λ is HIGH & µ is LOW then ∆λ is DEC
8. if λ is HIGH & µ is MEDIUM then ∆λ is SDEC
9. if λ is HIGH & µ is HIGH then ∆λ is NCHG
INC, SINC, DEC, SDEC, NCHG are fuzzy sets of ∆λ that denote increment, slight increment,
decrement, slight decrement and no change respectively. Henceforth, we shall denote each fuzzy set
for ∆λ as X. It is important to note that the fuzzy rules can be condensed to obtain fewer rules
or varied to achieve different goals.
The fuzzy rules are used to evaluate the fuzzy output of the inference module. The fuzzy rules
contain the conjunction & and therefore are evaluated using the AND (intersection) operator as
follows:
v(Γi → X) = min[fA(λ), gB(µ)] (5.18)
where A and B are representative of the fuzzy sets of λ and µ respectively. It is easy to note
that v(Γi → X) = hX(∆λX) and constitute the output of the fuzzy inference rule Γi, such that
hX(∆λX) is the value of the membership function hX(·) returned for a certain anticipated change
in λ denoted as ∆λX .
Defuzzification module takes the fuzzy output values of the inference module and converts
them into crisp ∆λ value. For the defuzzification module there are six different fuzzy sets with
membership function set {hX(·)}. We use the centroid principle, proposed by Sugeno(1985) for
the defuzzification process. This principle is also referred to as center of gravity method in most
literature on defuzzification. Each fuzzy set has a centroid ¯∆λX which coincides with the horizontal
coordinate that corresponds with the center of mass of the area under its membership function.
∆λ is computed as
∆λ =
∑
Γi→X hX(∆λX) · ¯∆λX∑
Γi→X hX(∆λX)
(5.19)
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Figure 5.6: BellShape membership functions for output variable ∆λ.
where ∆λ ∈ R and −1 ≤ ∆λ ≤ 1. Γi is the i-th fuzzy rule whose consequent belongs to the fuzzy
set X. We denote the pair as Γi → X. The values of {hX(∆λX)} are output values of the inference
modules fired by each fuzzy rule Γi. At the end of defuzzification process, λ is updated simply as
follows:
λ = λ+ ∆λ (5.20)
It is the sole decision of the FC to define the fuzzy sets and their membership functions used in
the FLC. The fuzzy membership functions come in different shapes such as triangular, trapezoidal,
sigmoidal, bell-shaped. In this work, a combination of sigmoidal and bell-shaped membership
functions were used for the fuzzy set of the input and output variables. This type of membership
functions have been used successful in modeling controllers as stated in [80].
As we stated earlier, the main goal of the FC is keeping λ low for the honest nodes and high
for the malicious nodes. The fuzzy rules {Γi} ensure that this goal is attained. The rules also
make it possible for a node induced into malicious behavior to recover once its µ reduces. A node
is capable of restoring its reputation, provided there is significant improvement in its reporting
over a number of observational intervals. The speed of restoring its reputation with the FC largely
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Figure 5.7: Triangular membership functions for output variable ∆λ.
depends on its current value of λ. With FLC, the restoration of the reputation is not drastic but
follows smooth transition which is reflected in the rate of change of λ. Likewise, a malicious node
that begins reporting by pretending to be an honest node is quickly identified. The persistence of
malicious nodes to compromise FC’s decision eventually reflects in the reporting. With the help of
the FLC, FC can detect the increased rate of false reporting and decide to increase λ, irrespective
of the initial values.
5.5 Numerical and Experimental Results
We conducted simulation experiments to evaluate the performances of the reinforcement learning
based Sybil attacker and the adaptive Fusion Center. In all experimental setups, we focused on
scenarios where the number of Sybil identities exceeded or is equivalent to the number of honest
identities (M ≥ N). The main intent behind the experiments is to show the impact of Q-learning on
the effectiveness of Sybil attacks and how the success of such intelligent attacks can be counteracted
using dynamic reputation mechanism (DRM).
The RL based Sybil attack was implemented using the following settings for the learning rate
CHAPTER 5. SYBIL ATTACKS AND DYNAMIC REPUTATION SYSTEM 141
and discount rate: γ = 0.1 and α = 0.8. The learning rate indicates to what extent the newly
acquired information should override the old information. We choose a relatively high learning
rate α = 0.8 for the attacker; this allows the attacker to quickly adapt to the sudden changes
in the effectiveness of its attacks. We set the discount factor as γ = 0.1, which indicates that
Sybil attacker is interested only in short-term positive outcome. The number of possible states
η = |S| = 10 and the number of possible actions |A| = M , which is equivalent to the maximum
number of Sybil identities that can be used in an attack.
For the dynamic reputation system, CR nodes in the simulation model were assigned different
false reporting rates {µi}, which correlated with the number of false reports that they can produce
on average within a predefined observation interval. The FC is not aware of these rates and at the
beginning assigns all nodes an arbitrary λ0 as the initial value of λ of their reputation functions.
By observing and monitoring the reporting trends, FC is capable of adjusting λi for each i-th node
with the help of the FL controller. Experimental results shows that λ converges and is independent
of the initial value of λ0. Performance in all experimental setups was measured as the number of
times the attacker was successful in fooling the FC to decide the spectrum state in its favor.
In subsequent subsections we present the analysis of experimental results obtained from our
simulation. First, we will show that the fuzzy logic based DRM is more effective in controlling the
reputation of CR nodes than the static linear reputation mechanism (SRM) [67]. Then, a detailed
comparison of the two mechanisms using the performance of the Sybil attacker during the stages
of attacks will be presented. Finally, we will compare the performance of the Sybil attacker under
the different identity sampling strategies discussed earlier.
5.5.1 Fuzzy Logic Control of λ
Our experimentation results revealed that the fuzzy based dynamic reputation system is effective
in keeping the influence of malicious reporting on spectrum decision-making under control. The
ability of FC to separate honest nodes from malicious nodes using the FL controller is dependent
on the parameterization of the membership functions. FC alone decides the acceptable ranges for
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λ∗, hence establishing the threshold for poor performance normally associated high λ values (see
section 5.4).
We also observed quick convergence in identifying and separating the nodes based on reporting
patterns. Nodes with high false reporting rates emerge with higher λ∗ values. As a result, their
reports are assigned low importance, which have no significant impact on FC’s decision-making
process.
5.5.2 Comparing Linear and Dynamic Reputation Systems
In a linear reputation mechanism, the reputation values of nodes are initialized to be 1 at the
beginning and updated according to the following relations:
ri =

ri + δr spectrum report is correct
ri spectrum report is wrong
(5.21)
where ri is the reputation of the i-th node and δr is the pre-determined quantum of increase in
reputation for each correct report. The reputation values are used as weights after normalization,





For the experimental setup, we set N = 7 and the corresponding λ values for the nodes {λi} =
{4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10}. Reputation measurements are taken at the end of each observation interval
which consists of 20 rounds of spectrum reporting. Experimental results for Linear and Dynamic
Reputation Systems, collected over an observational period of 1000 time intervals, are illustrated
in figures 5.8 and 5.9 respectively. In our dynamic reputation system, the nodes are assigned
high λ value of 30 by the FC. This implies that spectrum reporting begins with FC assigning an
approximate reputation of zero, compared to the linear mechanism where reputation values are
initialized to 1 at the beginning.
In linear reputation approach, the reputations of nodes are not dynamically controlled; making
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Figure 5.8: Time series plot of reputation values of CR nodes as measured by FC using linear
reputation system.
Figure 5.9: Time series plot of reputation values of CR nodes, as measured by FC using
dynamic reputation system with FL control.
it possible a node maintains the same reputation over time. The approach does not take into
consideration of induced malicious behavior of nodes, where nodes make false reports influenced
by malicious activities. Also not considered is the malicious attack strategy, where malicious nodes
are passive during certain intervals but become active during those period where accurate spectrum
reporting is critical. Tracking such malicious nodes using this approach is highly ineffective and
inefficient and impacts negatively on spectrum utilization.
The approach we propose takes care of this scenario by being proactive about what nodes report
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Figure 5.10: Time series plot of λ values for CR nodes as updated by FC using FL controller
during the observation intervals.
in every interval. Based on node’s reporting history, which is embedded in λ and its current false
reporting rate, nodes are apportioned reputation that accurately reflects their reporting status.
The absence of a fixed threshold for false reporting rate also benefits the system. The threshold in
the dynamic reputation system is fuzzy, allowing FC to define a range of values (fuzzy sets) that
is acceptable. The fuzzy rules are defined in a manner that enforces correct reporting and deals
decisively with false reporting. An honest node with high false report is encouraged to restore its
reputation by consistently reporting correctly over a period of time. With a λ value that is high
and low µ, its λ value is slightly decreased until there is a significant improvement in λ. It is
difficult for a malicious node to exploit this mechanism because malicious node is persistent in its
attack and would be easily identified. Also, a rule exists that ensure that sudden increment in µ is
matched with a corresponding increment of the node’s λ. For honest nodes, such drastic change in
µ is rarely observed and if it occurs, is treated as a malicious attempt.
5.5.3 Comparison of Output Membership Functions
Here nodes are assigned the following false reporting rates µavg = {4, 5, 8, 11, 10, 15, 16} respec-
tively. Simulation results obtained under this setting are illustrated in figures 5.11, 5.12, 5.13, 5.14.
Figures 5.11 and 5.12 illustrate the reputation and λ series obtained with triangular membership
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functions for the output variable. Figures 5.13 and 5.14 shows the results obtained in the case
where ball-shaped membership functions were used for the output variable. Triangular and bell-
shaped membership functions are illustrated in figure??. In both scenarios, the input membership
functions were composed of sigmoidal and bell-shaped functions. By mere observation of the plots
for the reputation and λ values, there is little or no difference in the result obtained.
One thing that is common in both cases is that the reputation of nodes that are reporting
correctly most times are assign high reputation. For instance, in figure 5.11 the reputations of
nodes N1 and N2 become equal to 1 within few observation intervals. These nodes are favored
because they are reporting with false reporting rates that within the range that FC considers to
be low. The membership function fL(λ) for the fuzzy set LOW (see figure??) has the following
properties:
• The centroid is positioned at λ = 5.
• Maximum degree of membership is attained at the value λ = 0.
• The degree of membership gradually phases out as λ increases.
This explains the reason why nodes N1 and N2 were able to attain the maximum reputation faster
than the rest of the nodes. Node N3 falsely reporting at the rate of µ = 8 maintains high reputation
but fails short of attaining the maximum reputation. By shifting the centroid of the membership
function of the fuzzy set LOW to the left, it will be observed that N3 might eventually be unable
to attain such high reputation. The others {N4, N5, N6, N7} have low reputations. Since the false
reporting rates are high, the reports are assigned low importance. In a case where these nodes
are mere Sybil identities, operated by a single malicious node, their impact on FC’s spectrum
decision making will be quite insignificant. Compared to the linear reputation mechanism, our
approach is more effective in counteracting this type of scenario. In the linear reputation system
(see figure 5.8) the reputations of both the good nodes and the malicious nodes are very close and
therefore if the Sybil nodes do not need to be majority to overcome the reputation system and
corrupt FC’s spectrum decisions.
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Figure 5.11: Time series plot of reputation value for output variable with triangular-shaped
membership functions.
Figure 5.12: Time series plot of λ for output variable with triangular-shaped membership
functions.
5.5.4 Performance of RL based Sybil Attack
To demonstrate how the use of RL can enhance the performance of the Sybil attacker, we considered
two different methods employed by FC in making decision about spectrum availability: static
reputation mechanism (SRM) and dynamic reputation mechanism (DRM). In order to demonstrate
the benefit of employing RL in the attack, we further embark on comparing the performances of
a RL based attack and a random attack. Random attack involves the attacker randomly selecting
the number of identities k to use for false reporting in each stage. It is comparable to an RL based
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Figure 5.13: Time series plot of reputation value for output variable with Bell-shaped mem-
bership functions.
Figure 5.14: Time series plot of λ for output variable with Bell-shaped membership functions.
attack with  = 1 i.e. 100% exploration.
Using the SRM mechanism, we consider the following cases where an attacker implements:
random attack, RL based attack with  = 0.3 and RL based attack with  = 0.84. The results
obtained for the cases just stated are illustrated in Figure 5.15. In general, we observe that the
effectiveness of the Sybil attacks improves with increased verification error ξ of the FC. This trend is
expected as an increase in ξ indicates that FC cannot correctly identify the false-reporting identities
4The choice of  = 0.3 and  = 0.8 is representative of low and high exploration of the Q-table, chosen to
highlight performance at the two different exploration levels. Dependency of performance on the , which
varies between 0 and 1, would be considered in future works.
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Figure 5.15: Comparison of the Performance of RL based Sybil attack and Random action
based Sybil attack using SRM mechanism.
and penalize them. The figure further reveals the benefits of using an RL technique (Q-learning) in
conducting Sybil attacks. It can be seen that it is more effective if RL technique is employed in the
attacks with small . In Figure 5.15, it is obvious that best performance was mostly attained with
varying ξ when  = 0.3. This implies that the attacker explores the possible actions less frequently
and exploits the Q-table often to determine the best action to take in each stage, which eventually
leads to a better performance.
The same experiment was repeated using the settings as described above but now with FC
implementing our proposed DRM mechanism. Due to the effectiveness of the DRM method, the
performance of the Sybil attacker remains very low. Despite Sybil attacker’s use of RL, it was
not capable of “fooling” the FC into concluding in its favor. Irrespective of the attack strategy
adopted by the attacker, the DRM mechanism was capable of isolating the Sybil identities and
assigning them low reputations. The low reputations of the identities account for the very poor
performance of the attacker which is shown in Figure 5.16. DRM, in comparison with SRM, is a
better reputation mechanism to counteract the impact of Sybil attackers on spectrum decisions.
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Figure 5.16: Comparison of the Performance of RL based Sybil attack and Random action
based Sybil attack using DRM mechanism.
5.5.5 Comparison of Identity Sampling Strategies
In the next set of experiments, we compare the performances of the Sybil identity sampling strate-
gies discussed earlier. To test their various performances we implement SRM decision-making
mechanism for the FC. In the first simulation setting we kept  = 0.3. The result of the experiment
is illustrated in Figure 5.17.
It can be seen vividly that BP outperforms other sampling strategies employed by the attacker.
As seen in previous experiments, an attacker experiences performance improvement as ξ increases
which reflects FC’s increasing inability to accurately verify its decisions. Among the identity sam-
pling strategies, BP shows the best performance. BP strategy, which involves selecting highly
successfully but less frequently used identities, accounts for the improvement performance. The
poor performance of the IH strategy can be attributed to the low , which actually reduces the
randomness associated with attacker’s exploration of possible actions with different k.
A different result was obtained in the second experiment (Figure 5.18), where exploration
probability was increased to  = 0.8. BP still gives a better performance compared to other sampling
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Figure 5.17: Comparison of the Sybil identity sampling strategies based on their Performance
with varying ξ, with  = 0.3.
Figure 5.18: Comparison of the Sybil identity sampling strategies based on their Performance
with varying ξ, with  = 0.8.
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strategies. However, an interesting trend is observed for IH at ξ = 0.65 in Figure 5.18, where its
performance overtakes that of SW. This trend can be attributed to the increased exploration, which
allows the attacker to explore more often. The increased exploratory activity of the attacker adds
to the randomness that is already inherent in IH, thereby boosting its performance. We can also
recall that IH is randomized equivalent of BP and that explains why BP always does better than
it. It can also be observed in Figure 5.18 that the curves produced by IH and BP are congruent.
The difference between the two strategies is induced by the random selection of identities that is
biased towards the best candidate identities.
5.5.6 Comparison of Decision Making Mechanisms
The performance of FC is of paramount importance in controlling the effectiveness of Sybil attacks.
The goal, therefore, would be minimize the effectiveness of the Sybil attacks, despite the strategy
used by the attacker. FC assigns reputation to identities of nodes used in sensing reports and the
reputation of an identity reflect the importance of its report. Reputation values are used as weights
to arrive at the right conclusion about the state of the spectrum.
Here we compare the performances of the static reputation mechanism (SRM) and our newly
proposed dynamic reputation mechanism (DRM). The performance of a decision-making mechanism
is computed from the perspective of Sybil attacker’s performance. Better performance of the
attacker indicates inability of the mechanism to control Sybil attacks. Therefore we expect that a
better mechanism would reduce the performance of the Sybil attacker by reducing the number of
successful attacks. For experimental purpose, we kept ξ between 0 and 0.45.
The result of the first experiment with  = 0.3 is illustrated in Figure 5.19.
In general, we can observe that the performance of the attacker increases as ξ increases in
Figure 5.20. But we can make clear distinction as to which reputation mechanism is best in
maintaining control over Sybil identities. DRM mechanism presents a clear choice to control false
reporting from the Sybil identities.
The results obtained with  = 0.8 (Figure 5.20) does not differ much from the results described
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Figure 5.19: Comparison of the decision making mechanisms based on their performance
with varying ξ,  = 0.3.
Figure 5.20: Comparison of the decision making mechanisms based on their performance
with varying ξ, with  = 0.8.
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above. For the SRM mechanism, we observe a decrease in the performance rate as ξ increases but
DRM mechanism is more effective in keeping this rate low. We also observe that the trend for the
attacker’s performance using DRM mechanism is practically the same, proving the robustness of
the DRM.
The better performance of DRM mechanism can be attributed to the approach used in com-
puting reputation for identities. The non-linear reputation function assigned separately to each
identity is dynamically adjusted based on an identity’s performance over the period of reporting. It
is not as static and linear as implemented in the SRM mechanism. This gives the DRM mechanism
an edge to control false-reporting highly effectively.
5.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we present identity-sampling strategies that can be employed by the Sybil attacker
in choosing identities used in false reporting. The main aim of the identity sampling strategies is
to minimize exposure of the identities and enhance their reputation with the FC. We demonstrate
also that an attacker can improve the effectiveness of its attacks by employing RL techniques. The
attacker implements Q-learning algorithm and relies on the Q-table to determine the optimal action
(k identities) to perform based on its performance state. In future, we intend to investigate how
long it takes for the attacker, on the average, to learn the optimal action-selection policy.
We also present a novel dynamic reputation mechanism implemented by FC and used in keeping
false reporting under control. The reputation function is robust and effective in assigning the
appropriate reputation to nodes based on their performances. Our experimental findings reveal the
effectiveness of the dynamic reputation mechanism making the proposed mechanism a clear defense
choice against intelligent Sybil attacks.
Chapter 6
Conclusions
In this research, we studied the various challenges facing the application of cognitive radios in the
current state-of-the-art wireless technologies. We addressed issues relating to spectrum scarcity,
network starvation, self-coexistence and security.
To address the problem of self-coexistence of CR networks in a decentralized, we study and
propose multiple channel acquisition heuristics. We show that under limited communication con-
straints, these heuristics enable CR networks to satisfy their channel size requirements. One of
the proposed channel acquisition heuristics, the FAK algorithm, converges faster than the CFL
algorithm in a multiple channel acquisition scenario.
We show that under constrained supply of spectrum resources, the formation of risk-motivated
deference structure coalitions can be beneficial to the CR networks. We propose a risk-motivated
channel selection scheme that helps CR networks to access channel viability for transmission based
on the risk of spectrum contention. We also demonstrated that minimizing the risk of spectrum
contention could serve as an incentive for networks to merge and form deference coalitions.
As far as spectrum contention is concerned, we devised a modified version of the On-Demand
Spectrum Contention protocol that is distributed and cheat-proof with enhancement to promote
fairness and efficient spectrum utilization. Our proposed spectrum contention protocol MODSC,
eliminates monopoly and CPN manipulation that is common with the ODSC. We also highlight
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that the topology of the network can impact on the level of fairness in spectrum contention.
We present the dynamic reputation system, which provides the efficient and effective mecha-
nism to control the impact of Sybil attacks on CR networks. We present a concise mathematical
framework for spectrum decision making by the fusion center. This framework allows the fusion
center to combine spectrum reports (busy or idle) in a way that suppresses malicious reports by
taking into consideration the reputation of the reporting CR nodes. We also demonstrate the dy-
namic reputation system is robust and effective in mitigating intelligent Sybil attacks fomented
using learning techniques.
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